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ABSTRACT 
The Allied defeat at Arnhem, Holland in September 1944 
marked the end of one of the most bold and audacious, ground 
and airborne operations ever undertaken. Many military 
historian have incorrectly labeled Operation MARKET-GARDEN 
an intelligence failure. This statement is true only in so 
far as the Allied intelligence structure failed to persuade 
their commanders to alter the planned invasion despite the 
voluminous intelligence data acquired. But did these 
commander have hidden agendas which made intelligence almost 
irrelevant? 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the 
Allied, strategic and operational intelligence preparation 
for Operation MARKET-GARDEN and determine its adequacy. It 
also examines the political and military factors that caused 
the commanders failure to heed the intelligence warnings. 
The primary focus will be upon the British 1st Airborne 
Division and the battle for the Dutch town of Arnhem, however 
to properly examine operational situation one can not ignore 
the remainder of the First Allied Airborne Army and the 
ground forces of British XXX Corps. 
Although there are numerous studies of MARKET-GARDEN, 
few have focused on the intelligence situation leading to the 
battle. This study examines political and personal influences 
in the military command process and it has as important 
implications today as it did over fifty years ago. 
By September 1944, the Allies great march across Western 
Europe began to stall. With their logistical system 
tremendously overtaxed, the field armies struggled to 
continue offensive operations. The other great problem was a 
disagreement within the Supreme Command on how best to 
exploit their successes, and the apparent collapse of the 
German Western Group of Forces. The fundamental argument was 
between Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery, Eisenhower 
favoring a "Broad Front", while Montgomery was opting for a 
narrow flanking movement which would allow the Allies to 
roll-up the northern German forces and strike into the 
industrial Ruhr valley. It was out of this dynamic situation 
that Operation MARKET-GARDEN was born. 
Hastily planned, Operation MARKET-GARDEN was to combine 
airborne (MARKET) and ground (GARDEN) assaults on German-
occupied Holland. The plan called for the 1st Allied 
Airborne Army to seize bridges over major Dutch waterways up 
to Arnhem, after which XXX Corps would pass over these 
bridges and strike north. The operation was a failure 
because commanders at operational levels failed to heed the 
multitude of intelligence warnings indicating that the 2nd SS 
Panzer Corps had relocated to the vicinity of Arnhem. 
The failure to properly direct the intelligence 
collection, analysis and dissemination can directly be 
attributed to the overwhelming desire to execute this 
operation, despite the apparent risks, held by British 
Generals Montgomery and Browning. Montgomery rightly 
believed that this was the last opportunity to attempt a 
"narrow front" approach to operations in the west. Driven by 
his belief in the narrow front strategy and a desire for 
personal and professional fame, Montgomery overtly ignored 
intelligence and allowed a hastily and inadequately planned 
operation to be executed, which resulted in the destruction 
of the British 1st Airborne Division. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Bibliographic Review 
In the early morning hours of 26 September 1944, during 
a torrential downpour with temperatures dipping near 30 
degrees, the tattered remnants of the British 1st Airborne 
Division, 1,892 in all, withdrew from the vicinity of 
Oosterbeek, Holland after sustaining 7,077 casualties. The 
forces, with the aid of a gallant Canadian engineer company, 
operating in small boats, crossed the rain swollen Lower 
Rhine river to the southern bank and the village of Oriel--
thus ending what is arguably the most audacious combined 
airborne and ground forces operation of the Second World War, 
MARKET-GARDEN. 
MARKET-GARDEN, an operation conceived on 10 September 
and executed just seven days later, involved the combined 
forces of four nations totaling near one million men. The 
goals and aspirations of MARKET-GARDEN seemed noble enough--
to secure a crossing site on the Lower Rhine River, turn the 
Northern flank of the German Army, bypassing the prepared 
defenses of the west wall, occupying the heart of Germany's 
military and industrial might, the Ruhr, then proceed across 
the open Paderborn plains to Berlin ending the war in 1944--
and on the surf ace may have appeared to have warranted the 
use of the only theater level reserve, the First Allied 
Airborne Army. But were these goals realistic even in the 
euphoric environment of early September 1944? Or were other 
factors involved, personal and professional aspirations, 
which fostered a command climate in which an unsound plan was 
1 
pushed forward at all levels by a chain of command seeking to 
satisfy agendas that were less than noble? 
The distinguished British military historian John 
Keegan, in his widely accepted classic study of warfare, The 
Face of Battle, identifies the usefulness and deficiencies in 
the study of military history. 1 Furthering the stance of 
Count Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, Chief of the Imperial 
German Staff, Keegan discusses what Moltke called "General 
Staff" history, which can also be referred to as official 
history. In this type of history, the military historian 
tells the story of a battle in livid detail which is rich in 
imagery and tradition. It is true there is a time and a 
place for such accounts, especially if the intent of the work 
is merely to transmit the sights, sounds and feel of the 
battle. However, as Keegan points out, it is the duty of the 
historian to "propagate understanding of, not merely 
knowledge about, the past" and taking a definitive stand is a 
necessary precondition to doing this. 2 Keegan argues that 
the anecdotal historian avoids this responsibility, 
preferring to entertain by leaving out all that does not 
serve this purpose. The anthologist historian avoids it 
absolutely, pointing to a preference to allow the reader to 
make up their own mind. While the "General Staff" historian, 
"also avoids the responsibility, for his mind is made up for 
him by prevailing staff doctrine about the proper conduct of 
war and he will accordingly select whatever facts endorse 
that view, while manhandling those which offer resistance." 3 
, John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 13-77. 
2 Ibid., p. 34. 
3 Ibid. 
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This work in military history was undertaken with 
Keegan's philosophies firmly in the forefront, seeking to 
clearly take a stand and at the same time attempting to shed 
the biases of one that considers himself to be a "General 
Staff" historian and tempered by eight years of training, 
experience and indoctrination as an intelligence officer with 
the United States Army. 
Before continuing further, it is critical to have a 
comm.on understanding of terms. For simplicity sake, to 
prevent possible confusion, the terms used throughout this 
work are largely those of the modern American military, with 
a sprinkling of "civilianized" and World War Two era 
terminology. 
The best starting point is to address the three levels 
of war. The levels of war today are much the same as in 
1944, the division of military operations to assist the 
commander in understanding the areas of responsibilities, 
providing a visualization to the flow of the battle and 
assist in allocating resources to those areas. The levels 
are divided based upon their desired outcome and not 
prescribed to any certain unit size or level of comm.and. 
However, generalization will be made here for the purpose of 
clarity and applied to the military setting that existed in 
1944 Europe. 
At the strategic level of war a "nation or group of 
nations use national interests to determine their strategy to 
ensure an effective, response ••• [by) employing armed 
forces with the other instruments of national power to secure 
3 
strategic goals."' The strategic situation in Europe 1944 saw 
the Supreme Headquarter Allied Forces Europe (SHAEF), a 
coalition command formed from the Allied waring powers, 
attempting to carry out the political leaders' intent of 
destroying the German military, occupation of that country 
and the removal of the Adolf Hitler from power. 
In the operational level of war, joint and combined 
operational forces within a theater of operations performs 
subordinate campaigns while conducting and sustaining major 
operations and plans to accomplish the strategic objectives. 5 
Again, for the purposes of this study operational forces 
shall be the Army Groups, Armies, and their subordinate Corps 
which were the instrument to execute SHAEF directives. 
Finally, the tactical level of war is the most basic 
form of operations, including such actions as battles and 
engagements. These victories, put together, achieve 
operational level results. 6 Division operations and lower, 
for this study, shall be considered tactical operations. One 
reason that understanding the levels of war are vitally 
important is that the actions (or lack of) of higher level 
commanders have a great, and as shall be proven in this 
study, sometimes a tragic impact upon the subordinate levels. 
One other term that needs to be addressed, intelligence, 
seems simple though it is often misunderstood. Donald 
MacLachlan defines intelligence as n • •• quite simply, 
information about the enemy. Not just any old information, 
any scrap of gossip, or rumor, but relevant information which 
4 U.S., Department of the Army, Field Manual 101·5 Ooerations. (Washington, D. C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1994). p. 6.2. 
5 Ibid., p. 6.3. 
8 Ibid., p. 6.4 
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has been processed and made as accurate as it can be •. • " 1 
Intelligence is often confused with combat information, which 
is raw data that has not been analyzed and its value has yet 
to be determined. Michael Handel rightly points out that in 
order for the collection and analysis of intelligence to 
support military operations, "these [intelligence] experts 
must, in turn, be kept well informed of all the latest 
developments concerning their own forces' operations and 
plans. "8 As this study shall show, the separation between 
operational plans and strategic level intelligence collection 
in 1944 was suspect. 
This work is a study of the intelligence preparation for 
Operation MARKET-GARDEN, the airborne and ground invasion of 
Holland, September, 1944. More specifically it is a study of 
intelligence preparation for one battle, the attack leading 
to the seizure of the road bridge in Arnhem, and the combat 
commanders' influence upon the collection, analysis and 
dissemination process, and how that process can be 
manipulated resulting in tragic consequences at the tactical 
level. Further it is the thesis of this work to disprove the 
assertion of historians that claim the preparation for 
operation MARKET-GARDEN was an intelligence failure and in 
fact show that the reasons this operation failed can be 
traced to combat commanders at strategic, operational and 
tactical levels. 
1 Donald Maclachlan, "Intelligence: The Common Denominator,· in The Fourth Dimension of 
warfare, Vol. I: Intelligence. Subversion. Resistance,ec:I. Michael Eliot-Bateman (New York: 
Penguin Publishing, 1970). pp. 53·54. 
8 Michael Handel, "Intelligence and Military Operations," in Intelligence and Military Operations, 
ed. Michael Handel (London: Frank Cass Publishing, 1990), p. 1. 
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To support the assertion that MARKET-GARDEN was not an 
intelligence failure, evidence shall be presented focusing on 
Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, Commander of the 21st 
Army Group, and his role in the operational planning for 
MARKET-GARDEN. Pointing to a breakdown in unified strategy 
between the strategic level (Eisenhower and SHAEF) and the 
operational level (Montgomery and 21st Army Group), and 
fueled by the "narrow" versus "broad" front approaches, it 
shall be proven that comm.and influences had much more to do 
with the failure of MARKET-GARDEN than did poor intelligence 
preparation. Driven by desires for personal glory and 
prestige as well as suffering the effects of the euphoric 
"victory happy" atmosphere of early September 1944, 
Montgomery devised a tactically unsound plan and created a 
command climate in which this plan was nurtured and accepted 
with few criticisms. 
The foundation of research for this work shall be upon 
the intelligence preparation for MARKET-GARDEN, as the main 
objective is to disprove the intelligence failure theory. 
This will be accomplished by examining primary and secondary 
sources that will demonstrate the vast amount of intelligence 
available to Montgomery. When presenting primary information 
such as intelligence summaries, operations instructions and 
combat information reports, complete sectional extracts shall 
included. When studying intelligence source it is vital to 
capture not only the pertinent words, but also the context 
and flavor of the analysis. Secondly, the work shall focus 
upon the comm.and relationship between Eisenhower and 
Montgomery and an examination of the command climate in order 
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to understand why MARKET-GARDEN was planned accordingly. 
Lastly, the focus will be on the plan for the British 1st 
Airborne Division and its tactical execution, thereby probing 
the effects that strategic and operational levels of war can 
have upon the tactical level. 
In the fifty-two years since operation MARKET-GARDEN 
there have been numerous studies produced. Most of these fall 
into one of about three categories; general biographies of 
Montgomery or other key players that devote one chapter or 
less to the operation; general histories of the battle, many 
by former participants which trace events chronologically; 
and those that concentrate on the military arts which tend to 
focus upon general engagements and the role of various 
military specialities associated with the operation. Even 
during the 1994 publishing boom, to coincide with the 
fiftieth anniversary of the battle, most works could be 
classified in the above categories with perhaps one notable 
exception. In 1990, Robert Kershaw, a serving officer with 
the Parachute Regiment, published an extraordinarily detailed 
account of German tactical operations in and around Arnhem 
1944. 9 This meticulously researched work draws upon German 
wartime archives and personal interviews and is truly second 
to none. Kershaw's book avoids the Allied debates preceding 
the operation, instead providing the most detailed record of 
the opposing forces available. The British counterpart to 
Kershaw's book is Martin Middlebrook's equally superb work 
published in 1994. 10 Middlebrook, relying more heavily upon 
9 Robert Kershaw, It Never Snows in September (New York: Hippocrene Books Inc., 1990). 
10 Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944 (San Fransico: Westview, 1994). 
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personal interviews, captures every aspect of the battle from 
the numerous regiments which fought there. Due to the nature 
of the research method employed and its reliance on personal 
accounts of the battle, this work of scholarship shall stand 
as the foremost reference for examining the tactical 
situation at Arnhem. 
When reviewing the available literature on the battle of 
Arnhem, extreme caution should be used. Many of the widely 
read secondary sources were written using primarily other 
secondary sources a their mainstay. Because of this many of 
the commonly accepted myths about the battle are widely 
propagated and based little on fact. The second major 
consideration when examining the intelligence preparation and 
command decision process, is the declassification and release 
of ULTRA11 intercepts starting in early 1978. Any publication 
that does not consult this veritable gold-mine of primary 
source material should be severely scrutinized. 
Ronald Lewin is perhaps one of the best examples of a 
historian utilizing the post 1978 sources to alter his 
opinions. In his 1971 biography entitled Montgomery As 
Military Commander, Lewin is quick to deflect the blame for 
the MARKET-GARDEN failure from Montgomery: 
Eisenhower is as much at fault as Montgomery, for 
he promised a logistical support which didn't quite 
materialize and an effort by the American First 
Army on Montgomery's right flank, an effort which 
failing, meant that Montgomery had to use his 
precious transport to move up his VIII Corps to 
fill the gap. • • Arnhem was essentially a tactical 
11 ULTRA is the code name used for the Allied interception and decryption of German military high 
level wireless communication network. More on this subject shall be covered in chapter five. 
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failure - once the doubtful commitment had been 
undertaken - and for a multitude of reasons for 
which Montgomery was not responsible. 12 
Lewin furthers an often used argument that finds little 
historical support, the lack of logistical support by SHAEF. 
The motivation for this approach seems to be more from a 
continuation of the Anglo-American military rivalry than 
fact. 13 
With the release of ULTRA and his study ULTRA Goes to 
War, Lewin softens his support for Montgomery in light of the 
voluminous amounts of intelligence he received prior to the 
execution of MARKET-GARDEN. 
Here are the elements - arrogance, impatience for 
action and refusal to adjust a hastily frozen plan 
- that made MARKET-GARDEN a disaster even before 
Sunday 17 September ••• Many technical errors were 
committed before and after the 17th. • but no 
error was so grave as the failure to identify the 
presence of a Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area.,. 
Although quite right in his revised assessment, Lewin 
12 Ronald Lewin, MontaomeryAsMilitaryCommander (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), pp. 237-
238. 
13 Several detailed studies of logistic operations in World War Two ETO have revealed that the 
amount of supplies sent to General Patton's army prior to and during MARKET-GARDEN were a 
mere 500 tons more per day than would be used if they halted and were in defensive operations 
(a division required 650 tons per day to advance). Historian 8. Liddell-Hart points to the internal 
supply and logistic failures of the 21st Army Group such as. 1400 trucks down for maintenance 
causing only 800 per day to be delivered; the dedication of transport aircraft to the aborted 
T oumai airborne operation resulting in a six day fuel shortage of 1.5 million gallons; decision to 
resupply forward Corps with ammunition as opposed to fuel despite impending large scale 
offensive operations. Communication Zone estimates reveal 13,000 tons per day being 
delivered to the two army groups during September 1944. B. H. Liddell-Hart, History of Second 
World War (London: Cassell, 1970) pp. 589-590. Ronald Ruppenthal, gen ed., United States 
Army in Wortd War II The European Theater of Operations. 2 vols. (Washington D. C.: Center of 
Military History United States Army, 1987), vol 2: Logistical Supoort of the Armies Seotember 
1944·May 1945, by Ronald Ruppenthal. 
14 Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978) p. 347. 
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improperly labels MARKET-GARDEN as an intelligence failure. 15 
Reasons such as complacency and the fact that "nobody wanted 
to know" are more evidence supporting a command failure 
rather than an intelligence failure. 15 Lewin discredits his 
revision further by stating that the failure to disseminate 
intelligence on the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was a "pardonable 
error" on the part of Montgomery. As this study will show, 
it would possibly be a pardonable error for a novice 
commander that was inexperienced in the use of high level 
intelligence, however Montgomery was not such, having relied 
heavily upon intelligence in Africa and preparation for the 
Normandy invasion. 
Examining additional literature currently available, one 
can find as many theories for the failure of the operation as 
there are sources. One commonality among most works is the 
heavy emphasis upon the highly tangible tactical failures, 
which are often given as the reason for failure of the whole 
operation. Other Montgomery biographers have reached a wide 
range of conclusions including the Australian Chester 
Wilmont. This war correspondent argues that the failure of 
MARKET-GARDEN was the "result of tactical failures • • • this 
does not mean that the plan was overly ambitious or that the 
objectives were inevitably beyond his [Montgomery] reach. 1111 
R. w. Thompson in Montgomery The Field Marshal points to 
Nijmegan and the area on the "island" as the cause of XXX 
15 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., pp. 347-349. 
17 Chester Wilmont, The Struggle for Eurooe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 524 
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Corps inability to reach the besieged paratroops at Arnhem. 16 
"The plain fact is that the 1st Airborne division had been 
parachuted out upon a hopeless and impossible limb in 
accordance with a vain and irresponsibly optimistic plan, 
inadequately thought out. 19 
Major General H. Essame, who at the time of the battle 
commanded a brigade in the 43rd Wessex Division where he also 
served as historian, records the following endorsement of 
Montgomery: 
That at the decisive moment the Corps commander 
lacked adequate forces was no fault of his the Army 
commander's or the Field Marshal's had the 
entire effort been placed in the hands of the Field 
Marshal he might have ended the campaign in the 
autumn of 1944 •.. he himself thought so and he is 
not given to rash statements. 20 
These conclusions raise more questions than they actually 
answer. If the plan lacked adequate manpower resources at 
the critical place and time, whose fault was it? Eisenhower, 
committed the First Allied Airborne Army to 21st Army Group 
and from there the operational planners should be held 
accountable for the shortage in resources to support the 
plan. Besides, one issue that shall be addressed later, is 
the fact that the avenue of approach towards Arnhem could not 
support the vehicles of XXX Corps and additional resources 
could not have realistically made an impact on the rate of 
advance. This is further supported by Alun Chalfont who 
18 R. W. Thompson, Montgomery The Field Marshal (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1969), 
pp. 198-200. 
19 lbid. 
20 H. Essame, The 43rd Wessex Division at War. 1944-45 (London: William Clowes, 1952 ), p. 
132. 
11 
states, "Arnhem showed a serious error of judgment ••• and 
was a direct reflection of Montgomery's tactical thinking. 21 
One Montgomery biographer believes that Arnhem is "an 
incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by 
particular circumstance and the poignant tragedy of the 
stranded paratroops. "22 On the surf ace this may appear 
blasphemous to Arnhem historians, however if one accepts the 
Keegan theory that any penetration of the Rhine and the 
German Ruhr would have been quickly extinguished by the 
forming 6th Panzer Army preparing for the now infamous Battle 
of the Bulge, the statement is at least arguably plausible. 
The Keegan theory has much merit when the logistical 
situation in September 1944 is also considered. The Allies 
were unable to sustain prolonged offensive operations 
regardless of the "narrow" versus "broad" front strategies. 23 
The final two works that bear mentioning, are general 
works on MARKET-GARDEN. First, what is now heralded as a 
classic piece of journalistic history, A Bridge Too Far, that 
is flavored with great human interest storylines and accented 
with highly sensationalized accounts. For scholarly research 
it provides one of the better descriptions of Dutch 
underground and human intelligence operations. 24 In 1984, 
Geoffrey Powell, a company commander during the battle, 
published a well researched account of the battle that is 
based extensively on primary sources and first hand 
21 Alun Chalfont, Montgomery of Alamein (New York: Atheneum, 1976), pp. 252-253. 
22 Alan Moorehead, Montgomery (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1946), p. 247. 
23 Ruppenthal, Logistical vol. 2, pp. 11-19. 
24 Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster: 1974). 
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experiences. 25 Accessing many unpublished documents, Powell 
has compiled the best single volume bibliography on MARKET-
GARDEN. Although relying on much of the same research 
materials, this work and that of Powell conflict on its 
interpretation and thus the conclusion drawn from it. 
As these works are perhaps the best examples of the 
scholarship on the battle for Arnhem, there has yet to be a 
study that focuses exclusively upon the intelligence 
preparation prior to the battle. As previously mentioned most 
works only refer to intelligence as one small part of the 
overall battle or part of detailed studies of intelligence 
operations during the Second World War. 
As is evidenced by this literature review there is a 
need for this type of study, if not to right a historical 
wrong, then to produce a concise study of the intelligence 
preparation prior to Arnhem. However, more importantly, a 
study such as this can have a great impact upon the training 
of young military officers. It is through the study of 
military history that those in the profession of arms are 
taught to repeat the successes of previous generations, but 
more importantly to learn from their mistakes so as not to 
repeat their failures. Hindsight is truly twenty-twenty and 
the intent of this work is not to "what if" a battle that 
occurred over fifty years ago, but to examine the information 
available to connnanders at the time, learn from their 
mistakes and avoid such a tragic and needless sacrifice of 
life in the future. 
25 Geoffrey Powell, The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944 (New York: Buchan and 
Enright Publishers, 1984). 
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CHAPTER TWO: Strategic Overview 
Evolution of the ff'estern European !l'heater of Operation 
In order to fully understand the context and environment 
in which operation MARKET-GARDEN grew, one must review the 
strategic setting in western Europe from June - September 
1944. 
The operation code named OVERLORD, the long awaited 
invasion of France, like most military operations did not go 
completely as envisioned by the planners or the Supreme 
Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Over 650,000 
soldiers of the American, British and Canadian forces landed 
upon the beaches of Normandy on the Western coast of France, 
with the mission of breaching German defenses and firmly 
establishing a substantial beachhead from which to launch 
future operations. The planners had called for the securing 
of Caen by D+lO, after nearly seven weeks of the fighting the 
Allied advance had created a penetration only twenty-five 
miles deep, along an eighty mile front, with Caen still 
secure in German hands. By 18 July 1944, despite suffering 
in excess of 122,000 casualties, the Allies were preparing 
for offensive operations that they hoped would break the 
German lines, move them beyond the hedgerow country and allow 
for large scale mobile warfare. 
The Allied breakout at the end of July came with 
lightning speed on the American front. Field Marshal 
Montgomery, Commander of the recently reorganized 21st Army 
Group and operational commander for all ground forces, 
unleashed Operation COBRA on 25 July, the flanking attack by 
the newly formed u. s. 12th Army Group, General Omar Bradley 
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commanding. Despite the American successes, the deliberate 
and methodical Montgomery delayed the offensive operations of 
the British and Canadian forces, while seeking additional 
resources and time. General Eisenhower pressed Montgomery, 
"never was time more vital to us, and we should not wait on 
weather or on perfection of detail of preparation. "26 In the 
same spirit of urgency, General Montgomery ordered General 
Dempsey, commander of the Second British Army, to throw all 
caution overboard, to take risks, "to accept any casualties 
and to step on the gas for Vire."21 Field Marshall von Kluge, 
who had replaced the ousted Field Marshall von Rundstedt as 
commander of German Army Group B, committed his final 
reserves to stopping the Allies. On the 31st the American 
spearhead burst through the front at Avranches. Pouring 
through the gap, Patton's tanks quickly raced across the open 
country beyond. German attempts at stemming the changing 
tide were hopeless. The Fifth Panzer Army and remnants of the 
Seventh Army was trapped in a cauldron to be known as the 
"Falaise Pocket". This defeat was devastating for the German 
forces, not only in terms of morale but in the shear loss of 
men and equipment. Over fifty thousand prisoners were taken 
with 10,000 more soldiers lying dead upon the field. 28 
Despite the enormous success of the Falaise campaign, many 
26 Kent R. Greenfield, gen. ed. United States Armv in World war II (Washington, DC: GPO., 1954), 
The Eurooean Theater of Ooerations: The Supreme Command, by Forrest C. Pogue., p. 201. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Various sources have conflicting reports on the exact numbers killed, prisoners and escaped 
from the Falaise pocket, this author has elected to use the official U. S. Army History of World War 
Two. Kent A. Greenfield, gen. ed. United States Army in World war II (Washington, DC: 
GPO., 1954), The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, by Martin Blumenson., 
pp. 257-8. 
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tattered fragments of German units escaped westward, less 
their equipment, from the Allies trap. After the battle, 
accusations and attempts to fix blame for the escaping enemy 
were rampant among both British and American commanders. 
These feelings of distrust and the drive to claim personal 
credit for allied successes would haunt the theater in the 
months to come. 
Following the hard-fought campaign in Normandy, the 
Allies fielded forty combat divisions and forged north-
eastwards through France and Belgium. On 25 August 1944, 
Paris was liberated after four years of German occupation. 
Patton's Army was sweeping south and east of the French 
capital heading for the German frontier, while the British 
Second Army was off for Brussels which it occupied on 3 
September 1944. The next day elements of the British 11th 
Armored Division, commanded by General 'Pip' Roberts, entered 
and captured the port city of Antwerp saving its harbor, 
sluice gates and port installations before the Germans could 
destroy them. However the glory was short lived, as Roberts' 
forces were ordered to stop short of the Albert Canal. This 
permitted the German Fifteenth Army to escape to Beveland and 
Walcheren Islands, by moving at night and on small crafts 
they were able to reach the safety of the mainland where the 
Allies would soon again have to face their dreaded foe. 29 By 
29 Historian Alistair Horne quotes a 21st Army Group Intelligence Summary by Intelligence Officer, 
Brigadier Bill Williams which stated that by 18 September, "probably over 100,000 men had 
crossed into the Scheidt Peninsula since Antwerp was captured.· Horne further states that, 
"Their presence at Arnhem would tilt the balance and turn what might have been a victory into 
disaster, sacrificing a fine division and the lives of thousands of British, American and Polish 
airborne troops.· Alistair Horne and David Montgomery, Monty The Lonely Leader. 1944-1945 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 279. 
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controlling the estuary and the harbor approaches, the 
Germans rendered the port useless, meaning that all supplies 
and critical resources would still have to travel via ground 
transportation over the 400 miles from the Normandy beaches. 
The critical nature of the Antwerp ports can not be 
overstated. In the final days of August and early September 
the Allied offensive approached overextension as the armies 
pushed farther away from the few established port facilities 
while advancing as many as two hundred miles per day. The 
competition for logistical support sharply restricted their 
ability to continue. 30 On the same day that Roberts' forces 
reached Antwerp, Montgomery ordered them to halt fearing they 
were endanger of outrunning their administrative resources. 
To say that this displeased General Brian Horrocks, Commander 
of British XXX Corps, would be an understatement since his 
vehicles were freshly fueled and unlike General Montgomery he 
fully understood the importance of the port city. 
To my mind 4th September was the key date in the 
battle for the Rhine. Had we been able to advance 
that day we could have smashed through this screen 
and advanced northward with little or nothing to 
stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing 
a crossing over the Rhine. But we halted. 31 
General Roberts was rightfully more critical of 
Montgomery than Horrocks, who as a corps commander accepted 
3° FAAA Headquarters, "First Allied Airborne Army Report On Operations In Holland: September-
November 1944" (22 December 1944), p. 9. 
31 Brian Horrocks, A Full Life (London: Collins Press, 1960), p. 205. 
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much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's 
failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good 
General at seizing opportunities."32 The inflexibility of 
Montgomery would cost the Allies in time and personnel, the 
Antwerp port which would not be operational for three months 
and at the cost of 30,000 servicemen killed, missing and 
wounded. Later 40,000 tons of supplies daily, enough to 
support two million fighting forces, would pass through the 
port. 33 In fairness to Montgomery, a large portion of the 
failure to secure the Scheldt estuary should be shared with 
the combat commander on the ground, Roberts. It was his duty 
to ensure that his superiors had a firm understanding of the 
tactical situation in their area of operations. Secondly, 
the Supreme Commander is not void of harsh criticism for his 
failure to stress the urgent importance of securing the port 
for future operations and his inability to recognize this 
fact until 8 October, at which time he ordered that to become 
the main focus of Montgomery's forces. 
By mid-September the Second British Army, comprised of 
VIII, XII and XXX Corps, were formed in a line roughly that 
followed that of the Meuse-Escaut Canal. To the southeast, 
First u. s. Army had advanced to the German frontier and the 
Siegfried Line near Aachen. Farther south, Third u. s. Army 
had established bridgeheads over the River Moselle north of 
Metz. The losses inflicted by the advancing Allied armies on 
the forces of German high command in the west were almost 
32 Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and 
Enright, 1983), pp. 201-2. 
33 Geoffrey Powell, The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem. 1944 (New York: Franklin Watts, 
1984). p. 21. 
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incomprehensible. Of the forty-eight German infantry 
divisions fighting in France on June 6th, three had been 
evacuated from the West altogether. Nine were being 
reconstructed in the Replacement Army. Seven were besieged 
in French ports. Eight had been dissolved as "beyond repair" 
and of the twenty-one still nominally in the order of battle, 
eight were classified as remnants. Twenty-seven infantry 
divisions that once were the backbone of the western defenses 
had simply disappeared after the fighting in France. The 
Panzer divisions suffered the same fate with eleven of twelve 
reduced to the size of armor companieS. 34 
The German Army in the west had been broken and after 
sustaining 500,000 casualties (with 250,000 dead), it was in 
a headlong and disorderly retreat back to "the Fatherland". 
The culmination of this withdrawal from the battlefield in 
Holland occurred on 5 September and is known in Dutch history 
as Dolle Dinsdag (Mad Tuesday). Allied commanders and 
planners at all levels seemed to be greatly affected by the 
victory virus. The Joint Intelligence Committee published a 
staff estimate in which they predicted that the German 
capacity to resist was extremely minimal and that the war 
could feasibly be ended by December 1944. 35 This estimate 
was sharply criticized by Winston Churchill, who during this 
time seemly was one of very few who resisted the euphoria 
that spread on the continent: 
34 John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy From 0-0ay to the Liberation of Paris (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1983), p. 315. 
35 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), Joint Intelligence Committee. 
Subject: "JIC SHAEF ( 44) 11 : German Intention In The West." 21 August 1944. 
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"I have now read this report, and have not noticed 
any facts in it of which I was not already aware. 
Generally speaking, I consider it errs on the side 
of optimism. It is at least as likely that Hitler 
will be fighting on January 1 as that he will 
collapse before then. If he does ••• it will be 
from purely political reason rather than 
military. ''36 
It was within this victorious atmosphere that operation 
MARKET-GARDEN was conceived. 
Broad Front -vs- Narrow Front Strategy 
The month preceding the Allied invasion of France, 
although littered with occasional disagreements related to 
operational concerns, represented the peak of Allied 
cooperation and unity. Coming off of successful campaigns in 
Africa and the Mediterranean, the Allies now focused on the 
conjointly accepted plan that would lead to the defeat of 
Germany. The planners had envisioned, after the breakout of 
Normandy, a mutually supporting two pronged attack led by the 
21st and 12th Army Groups. The intermediate objective, 
leading to the main objective of Berlin, was the Ruhr 
industrial region. When captured this would reduce German 
industrial production and thus their ability to wage war, 
possibly securing an unconditional surrender without further 
fighting. This would be accomplished by advancing the 21st 
Army Group along a line roughly from Amiens-Liege-Aachen, 
passing north of the Ardennes forest. The 12th Army Group 
36 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1953), vol. VI: Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 170-1. 
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would travel a course from Troyes-Nancy-Metz, south of the 
Ardennes capturing the Saar industrial region en route to 
Frankfurt then joining the forces from the north to encircle 
the majority of German forces in the west. 37 During times of 
optimum Allied cooperation the plan seemed feasible. 
However, soon the Americans and British found themselves 
engaged in two hard fought struggles, one against the Germans 
and the second between themselves. 
While the Allies were making great strides and achieving 
enormous successes on the battlefield, the situation within 
Allied command structure was strained almost to the breaking 
point. The original invasion plan for France called for 
Allied forces to reach the Seine by D+90, which they 
accomplished this nine days ahead of schedule, and to be at 
the Siegfried Line at D+350. Another dimension of the plan 
called for General Eisenhower to assume command of the 
theater as soon as the operational battle of Normandy was 
complete. 
As early as 2 July, prior to the Normandy breakout, 
Montgomery began advocating a revision of the grand strategy. 
Now calling for forces of British, American and Canadian 
armies, under his operational control, to concentrate their 
combat power and attempt a thrust to Pas de Calais. This was 
the beginning of several 'single thrust' proposals by 
Montgomery and strongly advocated by his supporters in the 
War Office, namely Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field 
Marshal Alan Brooke. Montgomery's proposals all had a common 
37 Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 657·64. 
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theme; they called for the numerically superior u. s. forces 
to serve in a supporting role under his leadership, just as 
in Tunisia and attempted in Sicily. Over the course of two 
months this would become Montgomery's obsession. Driven by 
his own ego, any plan put forth by another that did not 
conform to his own, was labeled tactically unsound or 
logistically impossible, leaving only his as the only true 
way to end the war in 1944. 
On 17 August 1944, with Montgomery having apparently 
little knowledge as to when he would be relegated to 
commanding the British and Canadian armies, he met with 
Bradley to discuss his future strategy. It was out of this 
meeting that came Montgomery's second single thrust strategy, 
that is as feverishly debated today by military professionals 
and historians as it was in 1944. Montgomery proposed a six 
point plan. " After crossing the Seine, 12 and 21 Army 
Groups should keep together as a solid mass of some forty 
divisions which would be so strong that it need fear 
nothing. " 38 Twenty First Army Group would move along and 
clear the coast, while 12th Army Group would form the eastern 
flank and move north of the Ardennes towards Aachen. This 
movement would pivot on Paris while the Seventh Army moved 
from Southern France toward the Saar. The basic objective of 
what essentially is the Schlieffen Plan of 1914 reversed, was 
to "secure bridgeheads over the Rhine before the winter began 
and to seize the Ruhr quickly. "39 Montgomery claims that 
38 Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. 
K. G. (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), p. 239. 
39 Ibid. 
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Bradley was in full agreement with his proposal and the only 
task remaining was to secure the approval of Eisenhower. 
Bradley was not in full agreement for he was convinced 
of the need to secure the port of Antwerp and to eliminate 
launch sites for the V-1 rockets, which were inflicting great 
civilian casualties, in London. He was willing to support the 
British northerly attack with an adequate level of American 
forces to cover the right flank (one corps from Hodges' First 
Army). 40 On August 18th, while receiving Eisenhower at his 
headquarters, Bradley outlined some of his reservations for 
his British counter-part's plan to end the war: 
There were any number of weaknesses in the plan. 
The principle one was that Monty would be in 
complete charge. We would be putting all our money 
on a horse that looked good in the paddock but had 
a tough time getting out of the starting gate and 
had never shown well on a fast track. we had well 
noted Monty's ponderous build-ups and long delays 
before mounting an attack, his apparent reluctance 
to take risks and pursue and exploit (at El 
Alamein, the Marth Line, Chott Line, Sicily, Italy, 
Caen on D-Day, Falaise Gap). Now he is asking us 
to believe that he could lead us straight through 
to Berlin in a single quick dash that would be one 
of the riskiest maneuvers in the history of 
warfare. 41 
The fears expressed by Bradley were in fact valid 
concerns. Few in the American and even the British armies 
believed that Montgomery was a commander particularly gifted 
with the mental flexibility and tenacity required of great 
40 Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar 
N. Bradley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 313. 
41 lbid.,p.311. 
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offensive generals. According to Michael Carver, Montgomery 
made "caution and calculations the bedrock of his military 
art. "42 In addition to questions of leadership and tactical 
thinking during offensive operations, there was the 
consideration of terrain. The terrain along the northern 
route is far less suitable for the employment of armor, as 
the countryside is riddled with streams, marshlands, canals 
and rivers, restricting mechanized forces to constricted and 
highly vulnerable roads. 
Shortly after the meeting, Eisenhower while at Bradley's 
headquarters, received a communication from U. s. Chief of 
Staff, General George C. Marshall stating: "the Secretary 
[Secretary of War, Henry Stimson] and I and apparently all 
Americans are strongly of the opinion that time has come for 
you to assume direct exercise of command of the American 
contingent. " 43 Marshall went on to congratulate Eisenhower 
and Bradley for their great victory in the Normandy campaign 
but no such compliments were forthcoming for Montgomery. 
On 21 August at a planning strategy meeting, that 
Montgomery chose not to attend, Eisenhower announced that he 
would take personal command on 1 September 1944. One might 
wonder why Montgomery could be so noticeably absent from a 
meeting of such magnitude, given his obsession with the 
future course of the Allies in Europe. His Chief of Staff, 
Francis de Guingand explained that Montgomery disliked facing 
what he called, "the inefficient staff officers at SHAEF that 
42 Michael Carver·, "Montgomery" in Churchill's Generals ed. John Keegan (New York: Grove 
Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 149. 
43 Stephen Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwiaht D. 
Eisenhower (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1970), p. 498. 
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he believed were disloyal to him and also despite all of his 
self-confidence he hated to be asked questions directly." 44 
After sending de Guingand, unsuccessfully, to convince 
Eisenhower to alter his decision, Montgomery proposed a 
meeting at his TAC Headquarters on the 23rd of August. 
During this meeting Montgomery again laid out the merits of a 
single unified thrust, outlining the need to concentrate 
logistic and maintenance resources and pointing to the fact 
that administratively they were too weak for the broad front 
to be successful. Montgomery prophetically stated, "if he 
[Eisenhower) adopted the broad front strategy, with the whole 
line advancing and everyone fighting all the time, the 
advance would inevitably peter out, the Germans would be 
given time to recover, and the war would go on all through 
the winter and well into 1945. "45 Montgomery went on to lobby 
for his retention as ground forces commander by saying, "a 
Supreme commander should sit on a very lofty perch and not 
descend into the land battle and become a ground C in C." 46 
Seeing that he was unable to win his case, Montgomery 
halfheartedly offered to serve under Bradley, a proposal 
which he knew that Eisenhower was in no position to accept. 
Apparently aware that his warnings were going unheeded, 
Montgomery set off on yet another strategic debate by 
demanding an American Army of twelve divisions to advance 
under his control on his right flank. He fully understood 
that his demands would reduce Patton's army to just 6 
44 Francis de Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979), pp. 16-
17. 
45 Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 241. 
46 Ibid. 
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divisions and relegate it scarcely capable of defensive 
operations. Eisenhower, in his memoirs, diplomatically 
explains Montgomery's self-centeredness by stating that, "he 
lacked an understanding of the situation on other fronts." 47 
The Supreme Commander patiently listened to the proposal of 
his subordinate before agreeing that, as it has always been, 
the Ruhr was the immediate focus of all offensive operations. 
He ordered Bradley to commit Hodges' First Army north of the 
Ardennes to support the 21st Army Groups' right flank. 
Further he committed logistic support to the operation by 
directly allocating tonnage to support not only the British 
and Canadians but Hodges' forces as well. Patton's Third 
Army had been reduced to a supporting role. 48 
With the northerly advance making great gains of 250 
miles in just six days, it was evident that the German line 
had cracked before the Third Army as well as in the north. On 
4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX 
Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy 
miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second 
only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time 
to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously 
existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his 
memoirs: 
Had we been able to advance that day we could have 
smashed through • • and advanced northward with 
little or nothing to stop us. we might even have 
succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine •• 
47 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc., 
1948), pp. 304-305. 
48 Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 657-64. 
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• • • if we had taken the chance and carried on . • 
. the whole course of the war in Europe might have 
changed.•• 
As the Allies paused to resupply, Eisenhower, having 
already conceded to Montgomery's failed single thrust once, 
examined various strategies to finish what most now 
considered a defeated enemy. However, no one told the 
Germans that they were beaten and in an extraordinary display 
of improvisation, that only the German army could do, they 
formed units from remnants and established a cohesive defense 
out of chaos. Eisenhower consequently reverted to basically 
the same plan drawn up in London during 1943 by the planning 
staffs, which called for an advance along a broad front. 
Montgomery again outraged, met with his commander in a 
desperate attempt to alter his decision (the 12th Army Group 
had already begun their advance and were closing on the 
Siegfried Line). 
As the Allied military leaders formulated their future 
plans, Adolf Hitler deployed the second generation of his 
"wonder weapons", the V-2 rocket. In early September 1944, 
as the V-2s showered terror upon the citizens of London, 
military engineers determined from the rockets trajectory 
that the launch sites were in south-western Holland. Brooke 
informed Montgomery of the information and requested 
immediate operations to clear the possible launch areas. 
Thus during a critical military planning juncture, political 
influences from Britain applied pressure upon the commanders. 
Omar Bradley describes; "The sudden appearance of the V-2s 
49 Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. 
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provided Monty a heaven-sent (literally and figuratively) 
opportunity to mount another internal political campaign to 
have his way with ground strategy. "50 
The MARKET-GARDEN strategy was Montgomery's last hope at 
single-handedly capturing the Ruhr and then Berlin. Once a 
breakthrough in the south occurred, logistical support would 
shift and he would never again be in a position of such 
strength. He was fully aware that if successful and his 
forces were located across the Rhine, Eisenhower would be 
hard pressed to not exploit the success. Bradley saw MARKET-
GARDEN for what it was, "a desperate attempt by a man 
obsessively determined to lead a single thrust to Berlin 
• it was strategy by subterfuge, legerdemain. " 51 It is true 
that the plan curiously approved by Eisenhower was not sound. 
Instead of consolidating and linking the already overextended 
forces, this plan allowed over one-third of the total combat 
power to turn, change directions and create large gaps 
between Hodges' and Dempsey's armies, not to mention the 
massive amounts of supplies diverted from 12th Army Group 
which was engaged along all fronts. 
The strategic debates of August and September 1944 are 
still highly contested issues today. Most agree that the 
lack of unity behind one effort and the failure to exploit 
success no doubt caused setbacks in western European 
operations. However, historians are sharply divided as to 
which effort should have been supported and to what degree 
the Allies suffered from their periods of inactivity. 
50 Bradley, A General's Life, p. 326. 
51 Ibid., p. 327. 
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Liddell-Hart, although supporting Montgomery's reasoning, 
believes that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 
dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 
1944. 52 While many like John Keegan, supporting the broad 
front strategy, believed the Germans maintained enough combat 
power in 1944 to thwart any single thrust, as they had done 
on so many other fronts. 53 Logistically, the Allies were 
unable to sustain offensive operations along a broad front 
for a sufficient length of time to exploit their localized 
successes. Combining logistic problems with the Germans 
ability to counterattack isolated breakthroughs, the Allies 
possessed no ability to realistically conclude the war in 
1944.H 
With the execution and subsequent failure of 
Montgomery's narrow thrust, MARKET-GARDEN, the strategic 
debate did not subside. Montgomery began a campaign to fix 
blame for the failure on SHAEF due to the mythical lack of 
support provided: 
If the operation had been properly backed from its 
inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, 
and administrative resources necessary for the job 
- it would have succeeded • • • 55 
As he rallied supporters within the War Office and British 
Army, Montgomery lobbied furiously to be allowed to achieve 
52 Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594. 
53 Carver, Montgomery. pp. 162-63. 
54 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies. pp. 11-19. 
55 Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 267. 
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his greatness through the capture of Berlin. 56 The personal 
and professional relationship between Eisenhower and 
Montgomery continued to grow more antagonistic and negative, 
despite the best diplomatic efforts of the Supreme Commander. 
In December 1944, using the German counter-offensive now 
called the Battle of the Bulge as his platform, he advocated 
his restoration as commander of all ground forces. If not 
for the timely and tactful intervention of his Chief of 
Staff, de Guingand, Montgomery would have been relieved of 
command. Although he remained in command until the end of the 
war, "the August split never completely healed. " 57 
MARKET-GARDEN The Plan 
Immediately after Montgomery's conference with 
Eisenhower on 10 September, Dempsey ordered Browning to start 
planning Operation MARKET. Montgomery's formal order was 
issued on 12 September, after briefing General Horrocks. The 
plan called for the First Allied Airborne Army to assist 
Second Army in a rapid advance from the Meuse-Escaut Canal to 
the Zuider Zee--a distance near 100 miles. 
Operation MARKET, the airborne portion, would capture 
bridges over the major rivers and canals at three towns 
Eindhoven, about 13 miles from the start line, Nijmegan 53 
56 One could easily content that Berlin was a more important objective to the British than to the 
Americans. Occupation of the German capital would be vital for the control and stability of a post-
war Germany. The British were also highly skeptical of the alliance with the Soviet Union and 
prophetically feared a Soviet dominated Eastern Europe if they were to advance as far as Berlin. 
Wrth the Yalta conference still six months away, both politically and militarily Berlin as an objective 
was perceived to be realistic. 
57 FrancisdeGuingand, GeneralsAtWar (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964), pp. 102-112. 
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miles away, and Arnhem 64 miles away. (See Map 1, Appendix A) 
Operation GARDEN would see ground forces led by British 
XXX Corps, advance along a tree-lined elevated double laned 
road that ran through a drained marshland. The orchards, 
small streams and ditches greatly limited cross-country 
movement, the area between Nijmegan and the Lower Rhine and 
were so restrictive it was referred to as the 'island'. 
Supporting XXX Corps' advance would be XII Corps on the left 
and VIII Corps on the right. The ground forces of XXX Corps 
would lead with the Guards Armoured Division supported by the 
43rd Wessex Infantry Division. 
General Browning's plan called for the American 101st 
Airborne Division to secure crossings over the Aa River and 
Willems Canal at Veghel, the Dommel River at St. Oedenrode, 
and over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son, then capture the city 
of Eindhoven by nightfall on the first day. The Americans 
would deploy all three regiments, less artillery, in one 
airlift. 
The 82nd Airborne Division's first priority was the 
capture and control of the Groesbeek heights, high ground 
that dominates the surrounding area, followed by bridges over 
the Maas River and Maas-Waal canal at Grave. Once these 
objectives were taken the airborne forces could attempt an 
assault on the Waal River bridge in Nijmegan. 
The British 1st Airborne Division would have the prize, 
the road, rail and pontoon bridges over the Lower Rhine River 
at Arnhem. The British planned to drop upon the heath lands 
west of the city of Oosterbeek, eight miles from their 
objectives. Two brigades, the 1st Para and 1st Airlanding, 
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would drop on the 17th, followed by the 4th Para on the 18th. 
The Polish Parachute Brigade was attached and expected to 
drop south of the bridge on the 19th. Divisional forces were 
hampered by General Browning's decision to deploy the Corps 
headquarters on the 17th. This would require 38 tugs and 
gliders, enough to support the drop of an infantry battalion. 
Once ground forces linked up with airborne forces they 
would proceed north to the Zuider Zee, clearing the Deelen 
airfield enroute for the arrival of the 52nd Lowlands 
Division (Air Portable). When of sufficient strength, 2nd 
Army would turn right for an assault on the Ruhr. 58 
58 Information on the plan derived from Powell, DeVil'§ Birthday and Middlebrook, Arnhem. 
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CBAP'l!BR I I I Intelligence Collection Methods 
Signals Intelligence Collection (SIGIH) 
ULTRA, the code name given to the collection of high-
level signals of the German armed forces, was one of the most 
prized intelligence sources of the war. The value of its 
information justified its classification of "Ultra Secret" 
and its associated distribution restrictions. The effort by 
the Polish, French and British cryptanalysts that developed 
the ability to decrypt transmissions from the German modified 
Enigma machine, were perhaps the greatest achievement and 
contributions made by intelligence professionals in any war. 
Ralph Bennett, a British Intelligence Corps Staff Officer, 
worked for four years at Bletchle¥ Park, England, where ULTRA 
was translated, analyzed and disseminated. 
of ULTRA is extremely useful: 
His assessment 
For by of ten revealing the enemy's plans to them 
before they decided their own, ULTRA gave the 
Allied commanders an unprecedented advantage in 
battle: since ULTRA was derived from decodes of the 
Wehrmacht' s wireless communications, there could be 
no doubt about its authenticity, and action based 
upon it could be taken with the greatest 
confidence. •9 
As German forces withdrew closer to their homeland the 
use of wireless communications was reduced. However, in 
September 1944 vast amounts of intelligence was still being 
provided on the status of Army Group B, as well as other 
commands in the west. Intelligence related to German 
defensive preparations and troop deployments in the MARKET-
GARDEN area of operations was no exception. 
59 Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1979), p. 11. 
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During the time the Allies were debating strategy, 
consolidating logistics and deciding upon the next course of 
action, German defenses along the front stiffened. On 6 
September orders were issued from the Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command), subordinating 
the First Parachute Army, previously a training unit, to Army 
Group B, under the command of General Walter Model. The 
First Parachute Army, under General Kurt Student, was 
assigned to defend along the Albert Canal between Brussels 
and Maastricht. Further the message outlined the revised 
order of battle, identifying the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Parachute 
Divisions; LXXXVIII Corps with 719th and 344th Infantry 
Divisions; battle groups from the Netherlands formed from SS 
training units and Herman Goring Training Regiment. 
Supporting would be ten anti-aircraft batteries, equipped 
with the 88mm multi-purpose gun, deadly when utilized in an 
anti-tank role. 60 
Signals Intelligence confirmed the British Second Army 
intelligence reports concerning the massive withdrawal of the 
German Fifteenth Army from the Antwerp port islands. By the 
time of MARKET-GARDEN execution, reconnaissance and decrypts 
estimated over 70,000 troops and supporting weapons now were 
in frontal defensive positions along the Albert Canal after 
being withdrawn from the Scheldt islands of Walcheren and 
South Beveland. On 16 and 17 September, two of von Zangen's 
divisions arrived to help bolster Generaloberst Kurt 
60 ULTRA intercepts DEFE 3/221, XL 9247, XL 9466, (8 September 1944). The author has 
obtained copies of selected ULTRA intercepts from both the Public Records Office, London and 
Hartenstein Museum. For the purpose of footnotes and bibliography the Public Records Office 
file number shall be used along with the number (if applicable) and date of message. 
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Student's First Parachute Army; 59th Infantry Division under 
Generalleutnant Walter Poppe and 245th Infantry Division 
commanded by Oberst Gerhard Kegler. Badly equipped and under 
strength, they took up positions indepth near Hertogenbosch 
and Eindhoven respectively. 61 
ULTRA had tracked the orderly withdraw of the 9th 
'Hohenstaufen' and 10th 'Frundsberg' SS Divisions of the II 
SS Corps, commanded by Generalleutnant der Waffen SS, Willi 
Bittrich. Having been badly mauled during attempts to defeat 
the Allied landing at Normandy and the long withdrawal under 
contact, the divisions were reduced to battalion size and in 
desperate need of resupply of personnel and equipment. on 5 
September the Government Code and Cipher School Station X at 
Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire released a message 
monitored from Model's headquarters: 
Army Group B order quoted by FL I VO {Luftwaffe 
Liaison Officer] 1730 hrs 5th. (1) Stab Panzer Army 
Five with subordinated headquarters 58th Panzer 
Corps to transfer beginning 6th to area Koblenz for 
rest and refit by C-in-c West. ( 2) Headquarters 
2nd SS Panzer Corps subordinated Army Group B to 
transfer to Eindhoven to rest and refit in 
cooperation with General of Panzer Troops West and 
direct rest and refit of 2nd and 116th Panzer 
Divisions, 9th SS Panzer Division and 217th Heavy 
Assault Gun Abteilung. (COMMENTS: Elements these 
divisions and 10th SS Panzer Division ordered 4th 
to area Venlo-Arnhem-Hertogenbosch for refit in XL 
9188 ) 62 
51 ULTRA intercepts DEFE 31222. XL 9466 (8 September 1944); XL 9502 (9 September 1944); 
DEFE 3/225 (14 September 1944). 
82 ULTRA intercept OEFE 31221 XL 9245 (5September1944). 
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Additional messages identified Oosterbeek (near Arnhem) as 
the location of General Model's headquarters. 63 In fact this 
message was transmitted low priority due to the fact that no 
one from Bletchley Park had knowledge of the impending 
airborne operations. The exact date and time of its receipt 
by forward units is unclear. Model's presence on the 
battlefield would prove crucial as he traveled to Bittrich's 
headquarters where he coordinated the counter-attack against 
Nijmegan and Arnhem. 
ULTRA also provided valuable information on German 
intelligence efforts and their perceptions of Allied 
intentions. By the end of the first week of September, the 
German analysis of future enemy operations had pointed to a 
thrust northwards to cut off German forces in Western 
Holland, as proven by ULTRA: 
Allies in German reports: 
unspecified on evening 9th. 
Br Army) between Antwerp and 
(A) addressed to 
30 British Corps (2nd 
Hasselt. Bringing up 
further Corps possible. Eleven to fourteen 
divisions with eight to nine hundred tanks. Photo 
recce task (COMMENT: further specification of area 
incomplete but includes "west of Nijmegan" and 
"Wesel" to cut off and surround German forces 
Western Netherlands).•• 
Although this assessment was soon altered, and the airborne 
assault was a complete surprise, if proper consideration had 
been given to signals intelligence during the planning phase 
the Allies would have been aware of the importance the 
def ending forces placed upon the MARKET-GARDEN area of 
operations. 
53 ULTRA intercept DEFE 31225 (15 September 1944). 
64 ULTRA intercept DEFE 3/225 HP 242 (15 September 1944) 
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Signals intelligence collection for Operation MARKET-
GARDEN was more than adequate to support mission planning. 
Providing unit identification, location, strength and 
mission, is the commanders ultimate goal for his intelligence 
assets. The collection in preparation for Arnhem 
accomplished all of this. If observed carefully SIGINT even 
disproves the assumption of a defeated opponent: 
Taking the signals for this period as a whole • • • 
it must be said that while there are many 
references to shortage of fuel, ammunition and 
other supplies, and evidence of desperate efforts 
to reorganize a coherent defense there is little to 
confirm that the Germans had lost the will to fight 
or to justify Montgomery's optimistic statements 
about the enemy streaming homewards in headlong 
disorder."' 
Decisions by the 21st Army Group to devalue the importance of 
ULTRA directly conflicted with the immense faith the source 
had gained in other campaigns. This ineptness can be 
explained as an overly euphoric atmosphere in which 
operational planning was conducted in a vacuum, with little 
regard for the enemy. Ralph Bennett's outstanding summary is 
worthy of reprint here: 
The exhaustive study of western ULTRA from 1944-
1945 thus involved has gradually forced me to the 
unexpected conclusion that there is a striking 
difference between the heed paid to ULTRA before 
and after the great advance from Falaise. 
ULTRA' s warnings were disregarded over the capture 
of the Antwerp docks and before Arnhem and the 
Ardennes offensive with unfortunate consequences on 
each occasion.•• 
es Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, p. 349. 
66 Bennett, Ultra in the West. pp. 14~ 15. 
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Buman Intelligence Collection (BUMIH'.r) 
The German belief that their version of the Enigma 
machine was completely secure created an extremely accurate 
intelligence source where authenticity of information was 
virtually assured. In fact, if ULTRA information proved 
inaccurate it can be attributed to the 'fog of war' and 
German commanders not having a firm and complete grasp upon 
their own situation. If SIGINT represented a streamlined 
source of intelligence, human intelligence was often the 
opposite. The oldest of the intelligence disciplines, HUMINT 
is often shrouded in mystery and intrigue, tempered by the 
unique individuals that take part in the deadly game of 
espionage. Other sources of human intelligence available to 
combat commanders included information obtained from 
prisoners of war, document exploitation, use of counter-
intelligence agents and in the case of Europe 1944 the vast 
resistance movements in occupied countries. 
The resistance movements within Holland were varied and 
quite diverse, ranging from the conservative and highly 
political Orde Dienst (Order Service) to the radical sabotage 
organization Raad van Verzet in het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden (The Council of Resistance in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands). 67 Although active throughout the war, the value 
of information provided by these organizations was held 
severely suspect by the British. This was partly due to the 
67 Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch Under German Occupation 1940-1945 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1963). Provides an outstanding portrait of the underground movements, their 
motives and methods, from the start of German occupation until liberation. 
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1941 penetration of a major resistance network by the Abwehr, 
the military counter-intelligence department of the OKW. 68 
In what was to become known as Operation North Pole, 
headed by Abwehr Major Hermann Giskes, British and Dutch 
agents were captured and forced to transmit false information 
back to the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in London. 69 
Shockingly, agents transmitted their messages omitting all 
prior arranged security codes, which identified that the 
agent had been compromised, and these blatantly obvious hints 
were ignored in London. The size of North Pole continued to 
grow and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) dropped more 
agents and equipment into Holland, which was inturn captured 
by the German counter-intelligence forces. 10 
It was not until August 1943, when two agents managed to 
escape and travel three months across occupied Europe until 
reaching Switzerland where they contacted the SOE, that North 
Pole finally ended. Although many other networks operated 
successfully and provided highly accurate and trustworthy 
intelligence, the British never again sought to exploit such 
sources. On 6 September Prince Bernard of Holland, 
commander-in-Chief of Dutch military forces in exile, 
approached Montgomery during the preparation phase of the 
airborne invasion, with extensive information on enemy 
disposition and size from Resistance forces. Alarmed by 
coolness in which he was received and the casual dismissal of 
68 Hermann Giskes, London Calling North Pole (New York: The British Book Centre Inc., 1953), 
pp. 160-173 
69 The Special Operation Executive was a sub-section of the Military Intelligence Department of 
the War Office responsible for the training, deployment, and handling of under-cover intelligence 
agents operating in the occupied territories. 
10 Giskes, London Calling North Pole, 160-173. 
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the information, Bernard was convinced that Montgomery would 
allow nothing to interfere with his already established 
plans. ' 1 
By the end of the first week in September, Dutch 
underground reports of enemy armor consolidating around 
Arnhem were forwarded to London. This was later followed by 
a more detailed report on 15 September which stated, "S.S. 
Div Hohenstruff [Obviously Hohenstauffen) along Ijssel, sub-
units observed between Arnhem and Zutphen-Apeldoorn road. " 12 
American forces during the preparation phase gave much 
credence to HUMINT reports from Holland, gaining a valuable 
insight as to possible threats in their areas.' 3 Even the 
British 1st Airborne Division, rightly concerned with reports 
of enemy armor in Arnhem, thought the information being 
provided by the Dutch important enough to include in their 
Planning Intelligence Summary, dated 14 September 1944: 
Rather fragmentary Dutch reports confirm that there 
are twenty thousand German troops East of the 
Ijssel in the HENGELO-BOCHOLT-CLEVE area where 
tanks have previously been reported. The same 
sources also state that defenses are being prepared 
along the line of the I jssel which is a very 
formidable river obstacle. 74 
The use of Dutch sources to confirm rumors of armor in Arnhem 
would earn the 1st Airborne Division Intelligence Officer, 
11 Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 508-510. 
12 Information on Dutch Resistance messages are often referred to in secondary sources without 
citations. This information comes from observation by the author of the Resistance collection at 
the Hartenstein Airborne Museum in Oosterbeek, Holland. In addition to observing transcripts of 
Resistance message traffic photo were made of a situation map sent through enemy lines to 
British forces and returned after the war. It is unclear as to how high of a level this map attained 
and when, but it at least was in the possession of element of XXX Corps prior to 17 September. 
73 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 1C (Intelligence: Order of Battle Summary) to 
Field Order No. 11 (Operation MARKET)" ( 11 September 1944 ), 1. 
74 1st (British) Airborne Division Headquarters, "1 Airborne Division Planning Intelligence 
Summary No. 2 (Operation MARKET)" (14 September 1944), 1. 
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Major Maguire, a rebuke when the Airborne Corps published 
their next intelligence summary later that day: 
ENEMY opposition to the development of Resistance 
has been strong in HOLLAND as a result of this 
situation in the country and the extensive 
penetration of the population during the years 
before the war. It has therefore been impossible 
to develop a widespread network of Resistance in 
HOLLAND with W/T communications working to the U.K. 
The organization ( Orde Dienst] has, however, been 
in existence for a considerable time and is thought 
to have been penetrated by the Germans • " 
The Airborne Corps warns its subordinate, the 1st Airborne 
Division, against the use of Dutch HUMINT. This comes at a 
time when the 1st Airborne Division is seeking information 
from any source possible to provide an accurate picture of 
enemy activities since higher headquarters refusal to 
disseminate intelligence. 
The limited offensive activities throughout the Second 
Army area of operations resulted in fewer enemy prisoners of 
war (EPW) interrogations. The number of prisoners processed 
through the EPW cages dropped dramatically from 6563 on 10 
September to just 8 2. on 16 September. 16 But despite the 
decrease, Second Army was able to confirm order of battle 
information provided by SIGINT on the withdraw of elements of 
the Fifteenth Army and formation of the First Parachute 
Army. 77 
75 British Airborne Corps Headquarters, "Appendix C (Resistance in Holland) to HQ Airborne 
Troops Operation Instruction No. 1 (Operation MARKET)" (14 September 1944), 1. 
76 Second Army Headquarters, "Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 105" (17 September 
1944), 2. 
77 Second Army Headquarters, "Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 102" (14 September 
1944), 1. 
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With the reduction of the number of prisoners, it stands 
to reason that the number of documents available for 
exploitation would also be reduced. The 82nd Airborne 
Division published an Order of Battle Summary on 11 September 
1944, based in part, on document exploitation. It 
illustrates the extent of German transition from withdrawal 
to defense: 
There is no doubt that the enemy has made a 
remarkable recovery within the last few days, at 
any rate in the 21st Army Group area • A 
captured document indicates that the degree of 
control exercised over regrouping and collecting of 
the apparently scattered remnants of a beaten army 
were little short of remarkable. Furthermore, the 
fighting capacity of the new Battle Groups formed 
from the remnants of battered divisions seems 
unimpaired. 1 • 
Imagery Intelligence Collect.ion (IMIH!r) 
Imagery Intelligence provided outstanding collection in 
preparation for MARKET-GARDEN. IMINT collected directly on 
German forces, included disposition of II SS-Panzer Corps, 
and specific, minute details of enemy defensive preparations. 
Additionally, this discipline provided excellent collection 
for mapping, bridge reports, and drop zone/landing zone 
evaluations. In World War II, commanders relied heavily on 
!MINT; they trusted it. Curiously, even !MINT was 
disregarded in key planning sequences for MARKET-GARDEN. 
!MINT enjoyed great advantage over SIGINT and HUMINT. 
The simple fact is that commanders believed what they could 
78 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 1C (Intelligence: Order of Battle Summary) to 
Field Order No. 11 (Operation MARKET}" (11 September 1944), 1. 
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see with their own eyes. In their estimation, it was 
inherently reliable. Roy Stanley explains the photo 
intelligence appeal: 
The caveat uphoto confirmed" on a World War II 
order-of-battle target analysis, situation report, 
or intelligence estimate was a hallmark of 
authenticity. No other source of intelligence was 
so readily accepted by the brass. While the 
analysis of communications, radar signals, or 
whispered conversations might be every bit as 
expert and valid, nothing carried the impact of a 
photograph." 
In addition to reliability, IMINT enjoyed status as a 
stand-alone intelligence source. For this reason, it was an 
excellent confirming or corroborating collection method. 
Stanley relates this important point: 
As a source of intelligence, photography stood 
alone. No other source of intelligence was used 
throughout so much of the world, was in such 
general use at all echelons, had such a broad scope 
of application to combat, or was so much a part of 
operations planning at all levels. •0 
Given the outstanding reputation IMINT enjoyed for 
reliability and conunand support, it is unusual that this 
valuable intelligence was ignored. In planning for MARKET-
GARDEN, General Browning, British Airborne Corps Conunander, 
did just that - - discounted !MINT collection on his key 
objective. 
Browning's G-2, Major Urquhart, understood the 
importance of photo intelligence for planning. He stated: 
"Air photographs, constantly updated, were the basis of most 
79 Roy M. Stanley, World war 11 Photo Intelligence (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1981), p. 2. 
80 Ibid., p.3. 
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operational planning, and I spent much of my time at the 
Medmenham Photographic Interpretation Centre. "81 It was 
normally an important collection source for planning. 
As MARKET-GARDEN approached, Urquhart became concerned 
about the multi-discipline indicators that there was German 
armor in Arnhem. 82 In response, he tasked aerial photo 
intelligence to target the objective area, in hopes of 
convincing his commander of the dangerous development. 
Urquhart describes this episode: 
To convince Browning of the danger, I decided to 
try to get actual pictures of the German armour 
near the 1st Airborne Division's dropping zone, and 
asked for oblique photographs to be taken of the 
area at a low altitude by the acknowledged experts 
in this art, an RAF spitfire squadron • • The 
pictures when they arrived confirmed my worst 
fears. There were German tanks and armoured 
vehicles parked under the trees within easy range 
of the 1st Airborne Division's main dropping zone. 
I rushed to General Browning with this new 
evidence, only to be treated once again as a 
nervous child suffering from a nightmare. 83 
Urquhart directed an outstanding photo intelligence 
collection effort. Although Browning rebuffed the 
intelligence, it was clearly available. 
Terrain analysis, which is derived from a combination of 
all intelligence disciples, is a critical function of 
planning staffs. This is particularly true when planning 
operations involving mechanized forces. Terrain will often 
offer distinct advantages to either the attacker or defender 
81 Brian Urquhart, A Life In Peace and War (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 66. 
82 Ibid., pp. 70-73. 
83 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
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and will impact upon both forces courses of action. Clearly, 
intelligence staffs planning MARKET-GARDEN understood the 
impact and limitations posed by the polder regions of 
Holland. It is also clear that Montgomery and his 
subordinate maneuver commanders had knowledge of the terrain, 
which they believed to be irrelevant to their upcoming 
operations. 
The planning process for MARKET-GARDEN was an absolute 
failure. One example of this is the unrealistic mission 
assigned to ground forces for GARDEN, namely the relief of 
the 1st Airborne Division within twenty-four hours. In order 
to accomplish this, XXX Corps would have to fight their way 
64 miles through the strengthening enemy defenses along a 
single elevated causeway, through a polder region riddled 
with streams, canals, and marshlands that restricted off road 
movement. In an after action report to General Eisenhower, 
General Brereton, Commander of the First Allied Airborne 
Army, points out the necessity to quickly link-up ground and 
airborne assaults; in the Netherlands, terrain is a key 
factor: "Therefore, it is vital that the airborne thrust be 
joined with the ground thrust in a minimum amount of time to 
avoid undue losses. "84 Brereton, like many participants, 
consider Operation MARKET, the airborne portion a success, 
but the overall operation a failure because of the poor 
execution of the ground portion Operation GARDEN. 
It does not take an expert tactician to examine a 
1:100,000 scale map of the area to determine that it is 
84 First Allied Airborne Army Headquarters, "First Allied Airborne Army Report on Operations in 
Holland: September - November 1944" (22December1944.), p. 3. 
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unfavorable terrain for armored attacks. However, most of the 
strategic, even Army level planning was conducted on maps of 
1:250,000 scale or larger. On such maps Holland appears as a 
vast plain void of large scale vegetation and changes in 
elevation which so often constricts mechanized movement. 
This oversight is clearly not the case for MARKET-GARDEN. 
The First Allied Airborne Army in analyzing the terrain 
points to the numerous advantages it held for the defender: 
The enemy must depend on the canal and river lines 
if he is to achieve an orderly withdrawal. The 
capture of bridges intact is therefore of vital 
importance, and the difficulties of cross-country 
movement makes the enemy's task of denying them to 
the ground forces that much easier. 85 
American units derived similar conclusions with their terrain 
analysis; "roads are all embanked, and vehicular movement off 
of them in the low portions is impossible. "86 
Commanders understood the terrain disadvantages; they 
chose to ignore them. General Brian Horrocks, XXX Corps 
Commander, was responsible for leading the ground assault for 
Operation GARDEN. It was his responsibility to fight through 
and relieve the airborne divisions. As he records in a post-
war account, he understood the terrain, but disregarded the 
implications: 
I knew that it would be a very tough battle; 
especially so, owing to the nature of the country, 
with its numerous water obstacles and the single 
main road available for thousands of vehicles • • . 87 
85 First Allied Airborne Army Headquarters, "Subject: Enemy Situation on the Second Army 
Front", (15 September 1944), p. 2. 
86 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 16, (Tactical Study of the Terrain) to Field Order 
No. 11 (Operation MARKET)", (11September1944), p. 1. 
87 Brian Horrocks, Corps Commander (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 101. 
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Horrocks later recognized that an indirect approach from 
Nijmegan to Arnhem would have been better, carrying out a 
"left hook against the German forces on the western edge of 
the airborne perimeter. "88 
Clearly, terrain analysis was accurate. 89 There was no 
reason for it not to be. British and American units had 
Dutch military liaison officers who were completely familiar 
with the terrain and had studied its military application. 
In fact, for several years at Dutch war colleges an exam was 
given with the final question pertaining to an armored attack 
from Nijmegan to Arnhem. If the answer provided involved an 
attack along the main road leading between the two the 
student failed. 90 Terrain analysis is just another example 
where the commander understood the enormous risks involved, 
but accepted them in order to make the attempt possible. 
86 Ibid., p. 125. 
89 Perhaps the one notable exception was the decision not to drop 1st Airborne Division forces 
close to the Arnhem bridge. It was believed that the ground would not support glider landings, 
due to its softness. Once the division arrived they concluded that a limited number (Battalion size 
element - 38 gliders),of glider could have safely landed and possibly been in position for 
immediate capture of the bridge. 
90 Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 508. 
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CHAPTER IV COMMAND CLIMATE 
Military commanders during a time of war, regardless of 
the level which they command, have the unenviable task of 
making life and death decisions in the normal course of their 
duties. The burden of command, as it is often called, has 
profound and sometimes lasting effects upon those who have 
accepted this awesome responsibility. Those that confront 
the death and destruction at a lower and more personal level 
often bear the weight of this burden more heavily. This is 
not to say that any commander is immune to the effects or 
event that they might approach their responsibility without a 
sense of the grave consequences that their decision hold. It 
is only to state that the farther removed from the outgrowth, 
the easier it is to dismiss them from the mind. 
The commander is a person that through their style of 
leadership has a tremendous influence not only upon their own 
unit, but reverberations are felt in both senior and 
subordinate commands alike. This fact is extremely evident 
when examining the Allied command structure in 1944. Before 
illuminating on the analysis and dissemination of the 
collected intelligence, it is a prerequisite to have an 
understanding of the command climate which directly 
contributed to the wide acceptance of a plan so chocked-full 
of false assumptions and tactical errors. 
The relationship between a commander and his staff is 
the foundation of military planning. Commanders rely upon 
staff officers to provide them with highly accurate 
information and expert analysis based on sound judgment and 
knowledge. Although they do not have to personally admire 
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one another, a common professional working relationship must 
be developed based on a mutual trust and confidence. The 
same holds true for commander's relationships with senior and 
subordinate commanders as well. 
As previously discussed, the relationship between 
Eisenhower and Montgomery was at best strained. However, 
this was not a conflict which was confined to only the two 
commanders, but spread to encompass theirs staffs as well as 
supporters throughout the Allied armies. The staff rivalries 
that developed affected the working relationship between 
them. Each began to produced estimates that supported their 
commander in the battle against the other. This rivalry 
caused the staffs to grow farther apart and greatly influence 
the all important intra-staff communication process. 
Bernard L. Montgomery was no novice to the world of the 
intelligence staff, he retained a keen understanding of its 
workings and value. This no doubt was a carry over from his 
days as a divisional staff Intelligence Officer during the 
First World War. While commanding the British Eighth Army, 
Montgomery learned first hand the immeasurable value of ULTRA 
in his battles against Rommel's vaunted Afrika Korps. As 
SIGINT provided information on Rommel's situations and plans 
that directly contributed to Montgomery's victories at 
Alamein, Mareth, Medenine and later in Sicily; Montgomerys 
appreciation for the work of the intelligence professional 
deepened. This appreciation was visible during the 
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preparation phase of Operation OVERLORD. 91 
Given this background for appreciation of intelligence, 
one might find Montgomery's actions in the preparation for 
MARKET-GARDEN strange or abnormal, this is not the case. 
Montgomery's Chief of Staff, General de Guingand, noted that 
as early as 1933, his commander had an impulsive behavior 
regarding the use of intelligence during planning: 
Strange to say--since Montgomery's reputation is so 
firmly rooted in his iron discipline and 
cautiousness as a commander-- I found from the 
beginning that side by side with meticulous 
professionalism went a certain tendency to make 
hasty decisions, as much on the field as off it • • 
Which it was my privilege to perceive and often to 
mitigate as his Chief of Staff. in the Canal 
Brigade Exercise of 1933 when. .our Brigadier, 
Montgomery and I attempted to locate and bring 
battle to an 'enemy force.' As we could not locate 
these forces I was loath to alter our disposition; 
but by nightfall Montgomery became impatient and 
prepared orders for our own force to set out. It 
was only by perseverance and good fortune that I 
managed at last to get an RAF aeroplane to 
reconnoitre on our behalf; and to my intense relief 
it sighted our 'enemy' in laager. .I had managed 
to persuade Montgomery to await the plane's return; 
and with this information we were subsequently able 
to rout our opponents, thus earning Montgomery 
considerable kudos." 
Montgomery was strongly resistant to change, based on 
intelligence, once he had derived his battle plan. His staff 
91 The tremendous research of F. H Hinsley provides evidence to the extent of Montgomery's 
reliance on intelligence for the Africa, Mediterranean and European theaters. F. H. Hinstey, British 
Intelligence in the Second World War Its Influence on Strategy and Ooerations, 4 vols. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), vol. 3, part II. (Operation OVERLORD was the code name 
given to the 6 June 1944 Allied invasion of France). 
92 De Guingand, From Brass Hat To Bowler Hat, p. 2. 
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officers, understanding this developed methods of dealing 
with their boss: 
Both General de Guingand and Brigadier Bill 
Williams, Field Marshal Montgomery's intelligence 
advisors, had to develop special 'showmanship 
techniques' --a sort of 'Monty language' that would 
enable them to provide him with accurate 
intelligence while making it more acceptable to him 
to authorize the necessary changes in his 
meticulously prepared operational plans. 93 
General de Guingand was a personable officer, well 
respected by both the Americans and British alike. As 
Montgomery's Chief of Staff, he was able to handle the 
diverse personalities within the staff and broker between 
21st Army Group and SHAEF. He served to restrain and calm 
his often impulsive commander, while allowing him to save 
face. As MARKET-GARDEN drew nearer and staff officers were 
unable to convince Montgomery of the futileness of the plan, 
they called upon de Guingand to intervene: 
Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support this 
(Operation MARKET-GARDEN], Montgomery's supposed 
master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in 
Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I 
attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too 
many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was 
warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, 
that German armoured units were stationed there. 
However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely 
replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't 
know what's going on 1 ' 9• 
Montgomery despite the appeals of numerous informed 
individuals, was determined to execute a tactically flawed 
93 Handel, Intelligence and Milit§ry Qperations, pp. 28-29. 
94 De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. 
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plan that was doomed to failure because he perceived it as 
his last hope to prove the single thrust would work. 
Brigadier Bill Williams, 21st Army Group Intelligence 
Officer, as early as 10 September sought to alter the plan 
when he appealed unsuccessfully to Montgomery. Convinced of 
the accuracy of his information Williams turned his appeal 
toward David Belchem, acting Chief of Staff. Jointly they 
implored Montgomery to be reasonable, their concerns were 
brushed aside. 95 
There were others who would attempt to rationalize with 
Montgomery, but the end was always the same. As previously 
noted Price Bernard presented his evidence on 6 September to 
no avail: 
The British were simply not impressed by our 
negative attitudes. • The prevailing attitude was 
'Don't worry, old boy, we'll get this thing 
cracking'. • • the British considered us a bunch of 
idiots for daring to question their military 
tactics. • the average Englishman doesn't like 
being told by a bloody foreigner that he's wrong.•• 
The strongest appeal was made just prior to mission 
execution. Concerned with ULTRA and Dutch underground 
reports and believing that armor units were in Arnhem and 
with new equipment, Major General Kenneth Strong, SHAEF 
Intelligence Officer, brought his concerns to Eisenhower. 
The Supreme Commander ordered Strong and General Smith to 
proceed at once to Montgomery's headquarters, which they did. 
Smith requested first that Montgomery reinforce the Arnhem 
drop and when that failed he recommended cancellation. 
95 Powell, The Devil's Birthday, p. 43. 
96 Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 508~509. 
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Convinced of the future success that would be his and annoyed 
by SHAEF descending into operational and tactical levels of 
war, Montgomery refused. 97 
This ignoring of intelligence filtered down to even the 
tactical level. As optimism swept through the conunand, 
subordinate commanders, seeing the confidence held in the 
operation by Montgomery, opted for the same course. Lewis 
Brereton, conunanding the First Allied Airborne Army, like 
SHAEF was under pressure to use the highly trained and 
valuable airborne troops. Both General Marshall, U.S. Chief 
of Staff and General Hap Arnold, Chief of Staff U.S. Army Air 
Corps, had an interest in the inunediate use of the elite 
forces which they had fought hard to obtain. 98 After the 
cancellation of fifteen straight missions, MARKET-GARDEN was 
welcomed. Brereton, briefing his staff and the Corps 
Conunander, General Browning, on 10 September, pushed planning 
and execution ahead by stating, "because there is so little 
time, major decisions arrived at now must stand - and these 
have to be made inunediately. "99 
The relations between General Frederick "Boy" Browning 
and his commander were at an all time low. Browning 
previously upset by the lack of planning and preparation for 
Operation LINNET100 , scheduled for execution just thirty-six 
hours after receiving the mission, had resigned in protest. 
When the operation was canceled he withdrew his resignation, 
97 Kenneth Strong, Intelligence At The Top (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1969), p. 202. 
98 Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 279. 
99 Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 121. 
100 Operation Linnet called for the 1st Airborne Corps to land and drop the gap between the 
Dutch town of Maastricht and the German city of Aachen. 
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but still harbored ill feeling toward his American 
commander. 101 Browning again found himself in a hastily planned 
airborne attack, this time commanded by British generals. 
With the euphoric atmosphere about, his strong desire to 
command in battle and his previous resignation, Browning was 
not prepared again to challenge the decisions of senior 
commanders. 
This decision would prove tragic, for Browning as the 
Corps Commander, an expert in airborne tactics, should have 
been the person to elevate the firmest objections. This is 
even more true considering that Browning was perhaps the best 
informed commander on the enemy situation largely because of 
the efforts of his Intelligence Officer, Major Brian 
Urquhart. A twenty-five year old, energetic and bright 
officer, Urquhart worked feverishly to compile the most 
complete intelligence picture possible for the impending 
operation. 
Concerned with an intelligence summary produced by 21st 
Army Group on 9 September, that reported the 9th and 10th SS 
Panzer Divisions refitting in Arnhem, Urquhart set out to 
confirm these reports using other intelligence disciplines. 
He gained access to reports derived from ULTRA intercepts 
(ULTRA was authorized only at Army level), and confirmed them 
by using Dutch HUMINT reports. Recalling his attempts to 
warn his commander, he writes: 
When I informed General Browning and Colonel Walch 
of this development, they seemed little concerned 
and became quite annoyed when I insisted on the 
101 Lewis Brereton, The Brereton Diaries {New York: William Morrow & Company, 1946), pp. 337-
340. 
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danger. They said, as I remember, that I should 
not worry unduly, that the reports were probably 
wrong, and that in any case the German troops were 
refitting and not up to much fighting. This 
reaction confirmed my worst suspicions about the 
attitude of Browning and his staff, and I concluded 
that Browning's ambition to command in battle was a 
major factor both in the conception of 'Market-
Garden' and in his refusal to take the latest news 
on German opposition seriously. 102 
Relentless and convinced that a grave tragedy was about 
to befall the 1st Airborne Division, Major Urquhart requested 
the aerial reconnaissance photos discussed in Chapter III. 
Three days later when the photos clearly showed arm.or within 
striking distance of the landing zones in Arnhem, Urquhart 
pressed the issue and was, "once again treated as a nervous 
child suffering from a nightmare. I was beginning to be 
regarded as a spoilsport or worse. "103 As a reward for his 
diligence and detailed work, Urquhart was ordered by Browning 
to go on sick leave, reportably suffering from nervous 
exhaustion. He was recalled by Browning on 22 September and 
joined the Airborne Corps headquarters, where everyone was so 
painfully aware of the presence of enemy arm.or in Arnhem. 10 • 
102 Major Urquhart would later state that he, "did Browning a grave injustice. I did not realize until 
more than thirty years later ... that 'Market-Garden' was the offspring of the ambition of 
Montgomery, who desperately wanted a British success to end the war.· B. Urquhart, A Life In 
Peace and War. p. 72. 
103 Ibid., p. 273. 
1°" It is true that Brian Urquhart was young for a Brigade level Intelligence Officer, however he had 
proven himself quite astute and although emotional in his convictions, his work by alt accounts 
were based on sound judgment and research. These qualities would serve him well as Under 
Secretary General of the United Nations. Those that supported Urquhart at the time were in no 
position to help his cause. At First Allied Airborne Army headquarters. Wing Commander Asher 
Lee was alarmed to see the level of enemy activity in Arnhem, when studying the UL TAA 
intercepts. He presented his evidence to Brereton who sent him to Belgium to report to 21st 
Army Group where it fell upon deaf ears. 
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This would not be the last appeal to reach General 
Browning's headquarters. The conunander of the 1st Airborne 
Division, Major General Roy Urquhart (no relation to Brian 
Urquhart), was rightly concerned with the rumors (at 
divisional level they lacked the intelligence reports) about 
Arnhem and the lack of hard intelligence. "I knew extremely 
little of what was going on in and around Arnhem and my 
intelligence staff were scratching around for morsels of 
information. "105 The command climate within the division was 
similar to that throughout the Allied Armies, with the 
exception that with the preparation for and subsequent 
cancellation of fifteen straight missions the soldiers began 
to lose focus: 
By the time we went on Market-Garden we couldn't 
have cared less. I mean I really shouldn't admit 
that, but we really couldn't .we became 
callous. Every operation was planned to the best 
of our ability in every way. But we qot so bored, 
and the troops were more bored than we were. • .We 
had approached the state of mind when we weren't 
thinking as hard about the risks and we possibly 
had done earlier. i•fi 
The Brigade commanders under Urquhart's command did seem 
to care. Brigadier Shan Hackett, commander of the 4th Para 
Brigade and Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski, commander of 
the Independent Polish Parachute Brigade, both had expressed 
concerns during the planning for MARKET-GARDENS predecessor, 
COMET. After being briefed on the operation, which had no 
mention of enemy forces Sosabowski bellowed, "But the 
105 Urquhart, Arnhem (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1958), pp. 7-9. 
106 Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
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Germans, General, the Germans." 107 Hackett recalls the planning 
process of those planning the airborne operations, "their 
plans to put down an airborne division were impeccable. • .As 
cooks prepare a superb dish and then add salt and pepper •• 
• They prepared a superb deployment and then added a few 
Germans. " 106 Upon hearing the reservations of his subordinate 
commanders, Urquhart suggested a meeting with Browning. When 
Sosabowski told the Corps Commander his concerns, Browning 
replied lightly; "The Red Devils and the Polish Paratroopers 
can do anything. "109 
This was the command climate in which MARKET-GARDEN 
evolved, a command climate that greatly effected not only the 
planning process but the analysis of intelligence as well. 
Subordinate units held reservations about the plan and the 
enemy that was now a formidable opponent, especially for 
lightly armed paratroopers. Commanders were reluctant to 
voice these concerns because of a confidence in their 
commanders and an unwillingness to spoil the 'airborne party' 
and when a select few did they were brushed aside. 
Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination 
During the short planning process, the ground situation 
for the German army rapidly changed, as the Allied advance 
temporarily paused. In the short span of a week (from 10-17 
September), intelligence analysis indicated a change in 
German defensive posture and reorganization effort. Although 
101 Stanislaw Sosabowski, Freely I Served (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1982), pp. 139-143. 
108 Shan Hackett, I Was A Stranger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), p. 14. 
109 Sosabowski, Freely I Served, p. 143. 
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this intelligence had been accumulating for several week, the 
intelligence analysis prior to 16 September 1944 was not 
worded strongly enough to provoke reconsideration. 
A difference in the level of optimism exists between 
SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summaries Number 25 (9 September 
1944) and Number 26 (16 September 1944). These key documents 
were published, respectively, one day before planning began 
and one day before the operation commenced. Weekly 
Intelligence Summary Number 25 is broadly optimistic about 
conditions on the Western Front. Number 26 is more guarded. 
Unfortunately, 16 September was too late to affect planning 
for the operation and not strong enough to induce 
cancellation. 
The following excerpt from Summary No. 25 provides an 
example of the optimistic analysis: 
The past week of war has seen developments on every 
front which closely threaten Germany herself, and 
it is quite clear now that the encirclement battle 
for the Reich is beginning as collapses are 
reported from every part of the fighting front • 
. on 2 September, on the German First Army front, 
the enemy was still falling back under Allied 
pressure at such a rate that even vital operations 
orders were out of date before they were received 
by the uni ts concerned. 110 
Summary No. 26 is still optimistic but notes the rapidly 
reorganizing German Army, the influx of troops, and the new 
defensive posture: 
on 8 September the fighting on the MOSELLE in the 
NANCY-METZ area was very heavy and continued 
110 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, "Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 25" (9 
September 1944), p. 1. 
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without let up for the remainder of the week. 
Considerable defenses were constructed and several 
new formations were identified in this area which 
was receiving the highest priority for the 
allocation of both offensive and defensive type 
units. .Along the ALBERT CANAL some resistance 
was offered and 719 Infantry Division went into the 
line, coming down from HOLLAND to do its bit in 
halting the Allied Northward rush. Fifteenth Army 
in its coastal strip was making quite good progress 
in its withdrawal across to WALCHEREN and BEVELAND, 
and eventually to what was left of the ALBERT-CANAL 
line where parachute units were 
appear, prestaging the arrival 
Parachute Army. 111 
beginning to 
of the First 
Summary No. 26 also finally acknowledged SIGINT, !MINT and 
HUMINT reporting of the II SS Panzer Corps with the following 
paragraph: 
9 SS Panzer Division, and with it presumably 10, 
has been reported as withdrawing altogether to the 
ARNHEM area of HOLLAND: there they will probably 
collect some new tanks from the depot reported in 
the area of CLEVES. 112 
If General Strong was concerned enough to raise the issue of 
armor units in Arnhem with Eisenhower and even visit 
Montgomery, why then did he wait until 16 September before 
publishing it in an intelligence summary? 
Some historian argue that this analysis was too late. 
Forest Pogue noted: "Only on the very eve of the attack was a 
warning note sounded."113 It is wrong to conclude that there 
were no warnings in intelligence reports, combined with 
111 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, "Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26" 
(16 September 1944), pp.1-2. 
112 Ibid. p.7. 
113 Pogue, The SuoremQ Command, p. 283. 
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terrain limitations, which should have prescribed caution. 
The day operational planning began for MARKET-GARDEN (10 
September 1944), the SHAEF Daily G-2 Report clearly noted a 
change in the German army on the western front: 
There is also some evidence that units recently 
evacuated across the SCHELDT are already being 
committed on the ALBERT Canal. • .After a period of 
collapse, German forces in the WEST now show 
increasing signs of resistance as the Allies 
approach the frontiers of Germany. Enemy has now 
been able to form a cohesive front at least as far 
SOUTH as NANCY, though the line is weakly held in 
parts. The enemy is fairly successful in 
evacuating 15 Army to WALCHEREN, and it is 
estimated that some 40-50, 000 troops may get across 
with proportion (sic] of their equipment. .Enemy 
formations along ALBERT Canal are not sufficiently 
good class to hold the line but the Germans must 
now give greater priority to the area covering 
approaches to the RUHR and reinforcements to be 
expected include the reappearance of some of the 
armour the enemy has withdrawn. 114 
Important indicators were therefore present during the early 
planning stages for MARKET-GARDEN. The German Army in the 
West was transitioning from withdrawal to reorganization and 
defense. The Western Conunand was reinforcing the Albert 
Canal--the area through which XXX Corps was preparing to 
attack. Soldiers in the line were of doubtful quality but 
armored reinforcements to protect approaches to the Ruhr 
(Montgomery's objective) were available. These indicators, 
coupled with terrain analysis, should have concerned Allied 
conunanders. At the very least, it should have caused them to 
114 SHAEF, "G2 Report No. 98w (1200hrs10 September to 1200hrs11September1944), pp. 1· 
2. 
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carefully revise their plans. At the strategic as well as 
operational level, the conunand climate and rampant euphoria 
rode roughshod over intelligence and analysis. 
Weak analysis at the operational level trickled down to 
the corps units. Here, the conunand climate, particularly in 
the Airborne Corps, also hampered the planning process. In 
some cases, division-level analysis was more guarded and 
fairly accurate. 
The enemy situation included in the Operation 
Instruction for the Airborne Corps was fairly accurate, but 
was contradictory in its closing sentences. Certainly, the 
conunand climate and prevailing optimism were responsible for 
this contradiction. The following paragraph is taken from 
Operation Instruction No. 1: 
The enemy is fighting determinedly along the 
general line of ALBERT and ESCAUT Canals from 
inclusive ANTWERP to inclusive MAASTRICHT. His 
line is held by the remnants of some good 
divisions, including Parachute Divisions, and by 
new arrivals from HOLLAND. They are fighting well 
but have very few reserves. The total armoured 
strength is probably not more than 50-100 tanks, 
mostly Mark IV. There is every sign of the enemy 
strengthening the defenses of the river and canal 
lines through ARNHEM and NIJMEGAN, especially with 
flak, but the troops manning them are not numerous 
and many of low category. The flak is sited for 
dual purpose role--both AA [anti-aircraft] and 
ground. 115 
The bulk of this paragraph describes a fairly credible 
defense, reinforced with armor and focused on key terrain to 
115 British Airborne Corps Headquarters, "Airborne Troops Operation Instruction No. 1 (Operation 
MARKET)" (13September1944), p. 1. 
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halt Allied armored attack. However, in closing, it 
discredits the analysis by describing the troops as "not 
numerous" and of "low category." It is contradictory. If 
they were judged as ''fighting well," how is it they were 
labeled as "low category?" 
General Brian Horrocks, XXX Corps Conunander, was unaware 
that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were at Arnhem and 
implicated Montgomery and Browning because they did know. 116 
Regardless, he showed an appreciation for the difficulty of 
his task, based on intelligence analysis: 
It was obvious that the day of easy victory were 
over. What had been almost a military vacuum for 
48 hours previously was now rapidly filling up with 
paratroopers from all over Germany. Al though many 
of them were young and inexperienced, they were all 
dedicated Nazis and fought better than many of the 
regular forces. • • 11' 
At least in retrospect, the information his Corps 
Intelligence Officer acquired led him to understand that the 
enemy situation was indeed changing. 
Examining intelligence dissemination at corps level one 
can observe a disparity. General Browning, had a full 
understanding of the situation but chose to ignore it for 
reasons previously stated. Horrocks relates this situation 
here: 
In the course of the war, I had received many 
orders and instructions from Montgomery, but this 
was the first time that he, the master of the 
tactical battle, completely underestimated the 
enemy strength. I had no idea whatever that the 
9th and 10th Panzer Divisions were refitting just 
116 Horrocks, Corns Commander, p. 93. 
117 Ibid., p. 86. 
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north-east of Arnhem, nor had Dempsey so far as I 
know, yet both Montgomery and Browning knew that 
they were there. 118 
It is also noteworthy that Horrocks points out Montgomery's 
gross assumptions on enemy capabilities and strengths. It 
reaffirms Montgomery's desire to execute the plan regardless 
of intelligence. 
At the division level, commanders were much more 
interested in hard intelligence. They actually directed the 
intelligence collection and planning process reasonably well. 
These commanders were preparing to fight the enemy eye-to-
eye, so it stands to reason they would be more concerned. 
They were interested in ground truth. Generally, 
intelligence analysis at division level for MARKET-GARDEN, 
was much more conservative and realistic, based on the 
intelligence they had access to. Ironically, the divisions, 
with the least intelligence capability, provided some of the 
best analyses of their particular areas of operation. 
The 82nd Airborne Division's Order of Battle Summary (11 
September 1944) was particularly well done. Considering this 
summary was published the day after planning for MARKET-
GARDEN began, that analysis is quite accurate and 
circumspect. This brief passage conveys the nature of the 
product: 
There is no doubt that the enemy has made a 
remarkable recovery within the last few days, at 
any rate in the 21 Army Group area. .A captured 
document indicates that the degree of control 
exercised over the regrouping and collecting of the 
apparently scattered remnants of a beaten army were 
little short of remarkable. Furthermore, the 
118 Ibid., p. 93. 
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fighting capacity of the new Battle groups formed 
from the remnants of battered divisions seems 
unimpaired. .There seems little doubt that our 
operational area will contain a fair quota of 
Germans, and an estimate of a divisional strength 
in this area may not be far wide of the mark. 110 
In fact the 82nd Airborne Division was close in their 
estimate of the enemy strength. In their area of operations, 
the German 406 Division, hastily organized for the defense, 
was gathering cadre and recruits from training units, and 
troops from replacement and Luftwaffe battalions. 120 
Careful examination of this summary reveals another 
striking surprise. A passage in the Enemy Situation 
paragraph reports a unit which they failed to identify, but 
most likely refers to the 9th SS Panzer Division. This is 
extremely interesting because SHAEF did not officially 
acknowledge the presence of this unit until 16 September in 
their Weekly Intelligence Summary. The division's summary is 
hauntingly familiar: Uit is reported that one of the broken 
Panzer divisions has been sent back to the area north of 
ARNHEIM to rest and refit; this might produce some 50 
tanks." 121 In fact, the 9th SS Panzer Division was close to 
this total. 122 
It is conjecture to guess from which source the 82nd 
derived this information on the Panzer division~ SIGINT, 
HUMINT, or !MINT. They received a Dutch Liaison Officer on 
119 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 1C (Intelligence: Order of Battle Summary) to 
Field Order No. 11 (Operation MARKET)" (11 September 1944), p. 1. 
12° Kershaw, It Never Snows. pp. 119-124. 
121 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 1C (Intelligence: Order of Battle Summary) to 
Field Order No. 11 (Operation MARKET)" (11 September 1944), p.1. 
122 Kershaw, It Never Snows, p. 327. 
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11 September, who also could have provided this information 
through Dutch sources. 123 The importance here is that the 
division commander placed enough interest and credibility in 
the possibility of armored units in their area of operations 
to publish it in the analysis. This is much more timely and 
circumspect than their fellows at higher headquarters and 
could point to the lack of interference in the dissemination 
process. The American divisions received information from 
the British as well as their own permanent headquarters the 
XVIII Airborne Corps. 
II SS Panzer Corps disposition never made it down to the 
1st Airborne Division. The commander simply didn't know what 
he would face. On the part of General Browning, it was a 
conscious decision not to disseminate the intelligence. 
Rather than specifically preparing his commanders for a worst 
case scenario, Browning, like Montgomery, chose to assume 
away enemy capabilities and hope for the best. As an 
airborne commander, he was well aware that lightly armed 
paratroopers were no match for any more than a few tanks. In 
his Operation Instruction No. 1 (Operation MARKET), he 
identified the total armored strength in 21st Army Group Area 
of operation as 50-100 tanks. 124 This disclosure was not 
specific enough and consequently had little impact. General 
Browning should have indicated that two seasoned, but under-
strength, SS Panzer Divisions were situated near Arnhem--the 
final objective. 
123 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, Message to Commander, XVIII Corps (Airborne), 
Subject: "Lessons of Operation MARKET -GARDEN" (3 December 1944), p. 1. 
124 British Airborne Corps Headquarters, ·Airborne Troops Operation Instruction No. 1 (Operation 
MARKET)" (13 September 1944), p.1. 
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The commander of the 1st Airborne Division, General 
Urquhart, voiced his displeasure at the dissemination process 
at the battle: 
The planning of the operation was not helped by the 
scanty intelligence that was coming our way. I 
knew extremely little of what was going on in and 
around Arnhem and my intelligence staff were 
scratching around for morsels of information. I 
knew that what information we had received from 
across the Channel was bound to be out of date: it 
had filtered through various offices in the 2d Army 
and our own corps before reaching us. !n the 
division there was a certain reserve about the 
optimistic reports coming through from the 21st 
Army Group concerning the opposition we were likely 
to meet. Obviously we would have liked a more 
recent picture, but we were subordinate to corps in 
such matters. Browning himself told me that we 
were not likely to encounter anything more than a 
German Brigade sized group supported by a few 
tanks. .During the week an intelligence officer 
at SHAEF. .came to the conclusion that these 
panzer formations were the 9th and possibly the 
10th SS Panzer Divisions. The SHAEF officer's 
opinion was not shared by others and, even as our 
preparations continued, 21st Army Group 
Intelligence were making it plain that they didn't 
see eye to eye with SHAEF over the panzer 
divisions. Nothing was being allowed to mar the 
optimism prevailing across the Channel . 125 
The key commanders, driven by optimism, personal goals 
and limited planning time chose to not only ignore the 
disposition of the II SS Panzer Corps, but to actively impede 
the dissemination to their subordinate commands. This is 
patently obvious in 21st Army Group and 1st British Airborne 
Corps. The end results were that the division commanders, 
125 R. Urquhart, Arnhem, pp. 8-9. 
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particularly 1st Airborne Division, were deprived of 
extremely vital planning intelligence. 126 
CHAPTER V CORCLUSIOR ARD FINAL ANALYSIS 
Fate of the 1st Airborne Division 
Designed to last just 24-48 hours in length, MARKET-
GARDEN developed difficulties from the start. The ground 
forces of XXX Corps encountered tough resistance from 
remnants of the Fifteenth Army and the newly arriving 
parachute regiments. The Guards Armour Division, restricted 
by terrain, suffered severe causalities from German anti-tank 
fire. By nightfall they had managed to advance only six 
miles instead of the planned upon thirty-four. 
The paratroopers in Arnhem did not fair much better; 
leaving the 1st Airlanding Brigade to secure the landing 
zones for the next days drop, the 1st Para Brigade set out to 
secure the bridges. Immediately they encountered an SS 
Training Battalion that formed a blocking line and delayed 
their approach. One Battalion, under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel John Frost arrived at the bridge where he 
established defensive position on the northern approach, 
12
" It is necessary to point out that at least one historian after examining much the same materials 
as presented in this study excludes Browning from any wrong doing. Geoffrey Powell states, 
"Browning was in no way the man to endanger his troops by suppressing information that he 
believed to be true ... Like any other professional soldier, he was itching to lead into action the 
troops he had been training for so many years ... But despite these pressures, there can be no 
grounds for any suggestion that he deliberately hid information, either from General Urquhart or 
from anyone else. His conduct at the time of 'Linnet 2' is sufficient mark of his integrity. Nor would 
he have been justified in proposing that the 'Market' operation should be canceled on the 
information he had received - and that from an officer in whose judgment he had lost confidence. 
To have made such a stand would, in any case, have been a pointless gesture from his point of 
view. This time his resignation would have been accepted, and there were plenty of experience 
airborne commanders waiting in the wings to replace him, Ridgway among them. n Powell, Devil's 
Birthday, pp, 46-47. 
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while German forces controlled the southern approach. The 
remainder of the brigade was forced to form a perimeter near 
the town of Oosterbeek. 
General Model, who watched the airborne drop from his 
headquarters in Oosterbeek, traveled to II SS Panzer Corps 
headquarters where General Bittrich was preparing his units 
for battle. Dividing his two divisions he formed Kampfgruppe 
Harzer (9th SS) and Kampfgruppe Harmel (10th SS), with orders 
to secure the Arnhem and Nijmegan bridges respectively and to 
destroy the Allied forces. 
The situation continued to worsen for the 1st Airborne 
Division. Separated with only one battalion at the bridge, 
the remainder of the division repeatedly attempted to fight 
through to the bridge. Encountering strong resistance from 
the panzer troops they were forced to the perimeter formed 
around divisional headquarters at the Hartenstein Hotel in 
Oosterbeek. The failures and misfortunes for the 
paratroopers were many. In the early stages of the battle 
General Urquhart was forced to seek refuge in an attic to 
prevent capture and was absent during a crucial thirty-six 
hours of the battle. Weather in England delayed the arrival 
of the remainder of the division and the Polish Brigade. 
Most importantly the ground forces were delayed by heavy 
fighting along the single road approaching Arnhem. Unable to 
communicate and running low on supplies the division was 
being destroyed. Frost's battalion at the bridge battled 
tanks and mechanized forces until overpowered on the 21st. 
On 26 September, having still not been relieved by 
ground forces, the remnants of the 1st Airborne Division 
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withdrew across the Lower Rhine river leaving 7,077 of their 
their fellows behind as either killed, wounded, or captured. 
Final Analysis and Future Applicat.ion 
An important lesson can be learned by examining MARKET-
GARDEN; optimism combined personal goals and ambitions can 
destroy the normal military planning process. Commanders 
must control their command environments to ensure that it is 
conducive to proper planning based upon potential threats. 
This case study is clearly applicable to the United 
States military of today. Current confusion and shifting 
roles between conventional warfare and Military Operations 
Other Than War (MOOTW) make decision making and planning 
extremely dynamic. The transition to high-technology tools 
and high-tempo operations further complicate the issue. In 
short, the restrictive planning conditions in future military 
operations will mirror those restrictions and rapid tempo 
that the 21st Army Group encountered in September 1944. 
Part of 21st Army Group's difficulty in planning was the 
tempo of operations. From Normandy to Arnhem, the First 
Allied Airborne Army planned some 15 missions before 
executing MARKET-GARDEN and they had seven planning days 
before launching the mission. Such contingency planning is 
prevalent in today's MOOTW conditions. From Somalia, to 
Haiti and former Yugoslavia, military operational tempo is 
swift. Many contingencies occur in remote regions which have 
little or low intelligence priority. Under these conditions, 
commanders and intelligence officers must work the system so 
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that intelligence never again becomes irrelevant to 
operational planning. 
Montgomery would claim that Operation MARKET-GARDEN was 
ninety percent successful. One only has to look at the gains 
to see this is not the case. The great gamble had failed. 
Allied lines were now stretched northwards and dangerously 
thin. Germans forces continued to reinforce and the battle 
lines which turned into a stalemate until December 1944 when 
the German launched their counter-attack through the Ardennes 
forest. 
The debate over "broad" versus "narrow" front strategy 
would reach a climax during the Battle of the Bulge. 
American forces reeled under the 6th Panzer Army which split 
the 12th Army Group in two. Montgomery was given operational 
control of Bradley's northern most army. Capitalizing upon 
the shock, confusion and despair of the American forces, 
Montgomery launched a campaign to be reinstated as the 
overall ground forces commander, pointing to the successful 
German offensive as the primary reason. Criticism at this 
crucial time and Montgomery's failure to conduct flanking 
attacks against the German offensive, created a 
irreconcilable rift between himself and American commanders. 
It must be mentioned that despite its extremely poor 
execution, the narrow-front strategy itself had some merit. 
A single-thrust of forty divisions, as called for by 
Montgomery, may well have, in September 1944, been an 
undefeatable force. Conceivably this force could have 
occupied the Ruhr and pushed forward towards the German 
capital. However, this concept would have three fatal flaws. 
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Logistically the Allies could not sustain such large scale 
offensives with a force of this scope. Secondly, several 
divisions, perhaps as high as twenty-five would have to be 
dropped off to deal with surrounded or by-passed enemy 
pockets of resistance. Thirdly, political realities 
prevented the numerically superior u. S. forces from serving 
under British command, especially the much criticized 
Montgomery. With hindsight, the narrow front approach often 
seems appealing, however, when examined under the constraints 
of 1944 it is proven to be hopelessly unrealistic. MARKET-
GARDEN marked the high point of airborne warfare, since, no 
element larger than a division has been deployed by a nation 
using the vertical envelopment strategy. 
It would not be proper to attempt to fix all the blame 
for MARKET-GARDEN'S failure on the operational commanders. 
Eisenhower, as strategic commander, must share some blame for 
his consent to execute an operation which he believed to be 
little more than an limited offensive. However, those that 
advocate that Eisenhower should have intervened and stopped 
the operation are guilty of a gross oversimplification. The 
chain of command is a fixed and rigid structure that relies 
upon commanders at all levels to utilize their judgment and 
experience when making decisions. If the Supreme Commander 
would have extended his personal control on forces down three 
level of the chain of command, the political ramification 
would have been immediate and devastating to the Allied 
military alliance. 
MARKET-GARDEN unlike many unsuccessful battles has 
remained relatively void of scrutiny for over the past fifty 
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years and has not prompted the kind of controversy 
surrounding other command decisions. In the official U. s. 
Army History of World War Two, Charles MacDonald points out, 
"perhaps the reason for the lack of acrimony can be found in 
the narrow margin by which MARKET-GARDEN failed. Or, perhaps 
more to the point, in the license afforded commanders under 
conditions of success such as existed in September 1944 •127 
Military professionals understand the burden of command. 
Leaders accept full responsibility for all that happens or 
fails to happen on their watch; this is for a good reason. 
The power of personality in war, and the climate the 
commander fosters have profound influences on all aspects of 
operations, including intelligence. The command climate 
General Montgomery set, in planning MARKET-GARDEN, actively 
impeded the intelligence and planning process. 
The environment, and objectives (personal and 
operational) affected Montgomery to such an extent that 
intelligence became irrelevant to him. Had he enjoyed 
"perfect intelligence", it is unlikely he would have altered 
his plan. 
121 Kent A. Greenfield, gen. ed. United States Army in World war II (Washington, DC: 
GPO., 1959), The European Theater of Ooerations: Command Decisions, by Charles MacDonald, 
p. 442. 
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